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Abstract 
In many respects Vladimir Nabokov's 1962 novel Pale Fire and Mark Z. Danielewski's 
House of Le(Jlles, first published in 2000, are strikingly similar texts. Indeed, 
Danielewski's novel can profitably be read as a contemporary re-working of Nabokov's 
archetypal metafictional model. However, where Danielewski constructs his text as an 
open-work or 'blue screen' onto which the reader is invited to attach any meaning that 
they see fit, Nabokov quite explicitly constructs his novel as an infernal 'black box' 
designed to confuse and entrap the reader and enforce his control over the text and its 
meaning. Nabokov's novel is fundamentally author-directed, while Danielewski's novel 
is expressly reader-oriented. Reading Pale Fire through the lens of House of Le(Jlles 
allows for a radical renegotiation of the Nabokovian text. Danielewski's novel, I argue, 
allows us to recognize the points of instability latent in the unique structure ofNabokov's 
novel, and thus open up the text beyond Nabokov's attempted closure and thereby pave 
the way for new, innovative and creative readings. 
Introduction 
When asked if Nabokov's Pale Fire served as a major influence on the formal 
arrangement of House of Leaves Mark Danielewski had the following to say: 
"Considering that I have yet to read Pale Fire, I would have to say not enormously, 
although I was of course aware of what Nabokov had managed to do in the book" 
("Haunted House" 114). Danielewski's professed ignorance of the particulars of 
Nabokov's novel is surprising, for House of Leaves and Pale Fire are in many respects 
uncannily similar. Indeed, Danielewski's novel can profitably be read as a contemporary 
re-working and transmutation of Nabokov's archetypal metafictional model. Both novels 
present themselves as a commentary of a fictional work. In Pale Fire, we have John 
Shade's poem "Pale Fire" which is commented on and annotated by Charles Kinbote. 
Kinbote is an opportunist who purloins Shade's poem after the poet's death; he produces 
a willful misreading of the poem that effectively becomes an autobiographical text telling 
his own story. Similarly, in House of Leaves we have Zampano's text "The Navidson 
Record", a hilariously inflated critical explication of a documentary film of the same title. 
After Zampano' s death, his manuscript is, in turn, annotated, edited, and commentated on 
by Johnny Truant, who, like Kinbote, takes this opportunity to append to the text a series 
of footnotes that constitute long personal digressions rather than anything representing an 
objective and scholarly approach. Both works, then, fold back on themselves 
intratexturally, as one part of the novel purports to read another. As such, the subject 
matter of both novels is the interpretive process itself. 
"Self-conscious" novels - rather than presenting themselves as windows of transparent 
language that unproblematically give out on to a mimetically faithful representation of 
'reality' - foreground their status as fictional artifice. Within the tradition ofthe novel, this 
strain of self-consciousness has a long history and has been variously categorized and 
defined. One of the first major critical studies of the subject, Robert Alter's Partial 
Magic: the Novel as Self-Conscious Genre (1975), positions Don Quixote as the 
archetype of reflexive form and traces a subsequent lineage of Cervantic self-conscious 
offspring running from Sterne, Fielding and Diderot in the eighteenth century through to 
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such modern writers as Borges, Nabokov and Barth. Alter reads these novelist's self-
consciousness and lucid playfulness as symptomatic of an awareness of a dialectical 
incommensurability between fiction and reality, a recognition which fuels skepticism 
toward all fictional codes and conventions, and in particular the dominant tradition of 
literary realism, a form that found its apotheosis in the works of the great realists and 
bourgeois fabulists of the nineteenth century. 
For Alter, self-conscious fictions playfully flaunt their own artifice in order to point up 
the artificiality inherent in all novelistic representation, and in doing so polemically 
position themselves in subversive opposition to the "realistic" novel, the underlying 
assumption of which he describes as a "tantalizing contradiction in terms" (Partial Magic 
x). By exposing the artifice inherent in all fictional codes, self-conscious novels 
demonstrate how what we take to be "realism" is itself merely a corpus of conventions 
and stylistic devices that over time have come to generate an aura of "authenticity" and 
mimetic faithfulness. Thus, the ultimate motive of self-consciousness, Alter argues, is to 
delineate the limits of artistic representation and by extension human imagination and 
consciousness - in the face of an unrepresentable reality. 
While Alter's dialectical argument posits an unbridgeable ontological fissure between 
the products of the imagination and objective "reality", in Narcissistic Narrative: the 
Metafictional Paradox (1980), Linda Hutcheon undertakes to demonstrate how such a 
dualism is impossible to sustain, shrewdly pointing out that "[r]eading and writing belong 
to the processes of 'life' as much as they do to those of 'art'" (Narcissistic Narrative 5). 
For Hutcheon, the term metafiction specifically denotes novels that are not only self-
conscious but also highly self-reflexive, works that foreground their status as textual 
constructs in order to reflect and interrogate the narratological and textual processes of 
composition. Alter's argument focused on a constellation of ontological and 
epistemological issues surrounding the disparity he perceives between fiction and reality. 
Hutcheon's critical framework, on the other hand, focuses on a dialectic within literary 
tradition itself - the serial progression of two rival but occasionally overlapping forms of 
novelistic mimesis: the 'realist' mode or what she calls the "mimesis of product" novel, 
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and the modem self-reflexive novel, which through its tendency to interrogate its own 
genesis and compositional strategies reflects not so much "product" as "process mimesis" 
(5). For Hutcheon, the 'process mimesis' novel forces the reader to engage intellectually 
and effectively with the text in such a way that the distinction Alter draws between "art" 
and "life" is collapsed; such texts highlight the fact that acts of reading, writing and 
interpretation belong equally to the realms of "art" and "life." 
The reconfiguration of mimesis on this new level ostensibly affords the reader a view 
over the novelist's shoulder into the dynamic and ongoing process o/writing. This focus 
on the performative act of writing implicitly undermines the traditional realist conception 
of the work as an ostensibly faithful reproduction or mirror-like transcription of a stable, 
pre-existent reality. Hutcheon rightly argues that this "decentralizing of the traditional 
realistic interest in fiction, away from the story told to the story telling, to the functioning 
of language and of larger diegetic structures" is not - as critics of the F. R. Leavis 
persuasion have often lamented - an anti-mimetic rupture within a predominately 
representational tradition, a severance of the novel from its connection to "life" 
symptomatic of its sad decline into irrelevance (35). Pointing out that diegesis is part of 
the Aristotelian concept of mimesis, Hutcheon views the nineteenth-century mode of 
realism as more a "reductive limitation of novelistic mimesis" (5), more a "period-
concept," than the novel's paradigmatic form: "[t]he generic terms of reference in 
metafiction are still novelistic; auto-representation is still representation" (6). While the 
traditional realist text positions the reader as a passive consumer of an pre-constructed 
fictional world, the reader of modem metafiction on the other hand, through the act of 
negotiating and "concretizing" the text, is forcibly involved "intellectually, creatively, 
and perhaps even affectively in a human act that is very real, that is, in fact, a kind 
metaphor of his daily efforts to 'make sense' of experience" (30). 
Metafictional texts, therefore, both play with their readers and seduce them into a more 
active engagement with the reading process; affmning and fore grounding their own 
narrative and/or linguistic structure, they paradoxically enrich our sense of "reality" as 
itself a process of decoding and interpretation. Overt narrative and linguistic narcissism, 
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however, also forces the reader to acknowledge the patently fictive status of the text and 
the represented world. As such, the text's overt foregrounding of its fictionalityand the 
creative response such recognition invokes constitutes what Hutcheon calls the dual 
consciousness or "paradox of the reader", complementing the text's paradoxical focus 
both inward on narcissistic self-scrutiny and outward in appeal to the reader. For 
Hutcheon, these two paradoxes are the central and defining feature of modem meta fiction 
and the readerly response such texts demand. The focus on the writing process in 
metafiction broadens 
to include a parallel process of equal importance to the text's actualization that 
of reading. The reader is explicitly or implicitly forced to face his responsibility 
toward the text, that is, toward the novelistic world he is creating through the 
accumulated fictive referents of literary language. As the novelist actualizes the 
world of his imagination through words, so the reader from those same words 
manufactures in reverse a literary universe that is as much his creation as it is the 
novelist's. This near equation of the acts of reading and writing is one of the 
concerns that sets modem metafiction apart from previous novelistic self-
consciousness (27). 
The typology Hutcheon develops breaks metafiction down into works that are either 
"diegetically" or "linguistically" self-conscious. A "diegeticaUy" self-conscious text 
presents itself as narrative, as assemblage of novelistic codes; a "linguistically" self-
conscious text as language, an assemblage of marks and inscriptions upon a page. 
Hutcheon further distinguishes an 'overt' and 'covert' form of each of these two types: 
"[ 0 ]vertly narcissistic texts reveal their self-awareness in explicit thematizations or 
allegorizations of their diegetic or linguistic identity within the texts themselves," while 
in the covert form "this process is internalized, actualized; such a text is self-reflective 
but not necessarily self-conscious" (7). Hutcheon's theorization of metafiction is a good 
point of entry into the two novel's under consideration here - Vladimir Nabokov's Pale 
Fire and Mark Z. Danielewski's House of Leaves. Both these novels are overtly 
narcissistic texts that exhibit a high degree of diegetic and linguistic self-consciousness. 
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Pale Fire has proven to be a consistently problematic text for critical interpretation. In 
Nabokov's novel, the relationship between reader and writer is fundamentally 
antagonistic. As we shall see, the struggle for control between creative writer and 
criticlreader forms not only the subject matter but the very structural principle of the 
novel. Indeed, Nabokov is famous for what Maurice Couturier calls "authorial tyranny": 
the author, as 'creator', claiming supreme control over the text and its meaning. In Pale 
Fire, Nabokov constructs an enigmatic novel that is purposefully difficult for his reader 
to negotiate. In doing so, he not only affirms his own tyrannical hold over the novel but 
also guards against the invasion of the reader whose own attempts to command the text 
destroy, for Nabokov, its delicate tissue. Fundamentally, then, Nabokov strives to create 
an impenetrable textual 'black box' that denies readerly interpretation, thus preserving his 
own authority as the only key to unlocking the novel's secrets. 
This is primarily achieved through the authorship riddle that the novel poses the reader. 
The large number of echoes and correspondences between Kinbote's and Shade's texts 
inevitably draw the reader to question who is responsible for creating the novel's parts: 
Shade or Kinbote. That Shade and Kinbote do indeed represent two separate characters, 
or whether there is in fact a single author creating both the novel's parts remains 
ambiguous. This authorial conundrum has plagued critics since the novel's publication. 
The search for a definitive controlling voice within the novel predictably leads back to 
Nabokov himself as originator of the fictional text. Unable by themselves to elucidate the 
'true' meaning of the novel, readers are forced to return to Nabokov for answers. In this 
way, Nabokov's novel is fundamentally author-directed. 
Conversely, Danielewski's novel is expressly reader-oriented. Danielewski 
deliberately fills his text with epistemological paradoxes and aporias so that everything in 
House of Leaves operates as an interpretive challenge to the reader. But unlike Nabokov's 
novel, these conundrums force the reader to work within the text, making any number of 
'undecidable' interpretive decisions, each of which ultimately imbricates them in the 
process of generating meaning. Like Johnny, the reader is invited to enter into 
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Danielewski's authorial game, supplementing the text with their own unique voice, thus 
generating new readings. Rather than attempting to fix the meaning of the novel, 
Danielewski opens the text to further reinscription and reinterpretation. House of Leaves 
therefore necessarily remains a work in progress, continually being re-shaped by the 
reader. 
In this thesis, I read Pale Fire alongside House of Leaves, setting up a dialogue 
between the two texts. I argue that Danielewski's novel can help reveal the points of 
instability that reside within the unique structure of Pale Fire, and by extension the blind-
spots of previous Nabokovian criticism, thus opening the novel to new disobedient 
interpretations. One of the main ways this is done is by destabilizing Nabokov's 
authorship riddle. That is, by demonstrating, using Danielewski, how the very structure of 
Nabokov's novel renders null and void any definitive answer to the authorship tease of 
whether Shade or Kinbote wrote the book. Essentially, my thesis is itself structured like 
the novels I deal with. Just as Kinbote mis-reads Shade's poem, and Johnny mis-reads 
Kinbote's, what I am trying to do here is mis-read or, more accurately, re-read Nabokov 
by using Danielewski's noveL Through this very means what I hope to do is move Pale 
Fire beyond its author-determined point of closure, and open it up to a future-directed 
and reader-oriented process of interpretation. 
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commentary (significantly, also called "The Navidson Record") by an enigmatic Borges-
like character known only as Zampano, who is fond of mixing real and fictional sources 
in an attempt to provide a sense of erudition to his work. This exhaustive critical opus 
forms the "main" text of Danielewski' s novel and functions as the lens through which the 
reader views the events of the film. 
Between Zampano and the reader is twenty-five-year-old poet and tattoo parlor 
apprentice Johnny Truant, who functions in many ways as the reader's surrogate in the 
novel. By chance, Johnny comes into possession of Zampano's unfmished manuscript 
following the old man's death. Although scattered over thousands of scraps of paper, the 
manuscript nevertheless exerts a strange hold over Johnny, who begins the arduous labor 
of assembling it into a coherent order. In the process, he adds his own layer of footnotes 
to the text's already densely footnoted margins. More than simply glossing foreign 
passages and annotating references, Johnny's notes grow into long personal digressions, 
sordid tales of his empty sexual encounters and drug experiences in the L.A. club scene. 
A chilling story of alienation and madness slowly unfolds that subtly echoes and 
thematically parallels the events of the Navidson documentary. Finally, Zampano and 
Truant's work is brought together and published in book form by a group of unnamed 
"editors" who add their own further notes to the text. In the early chapters of the novel 
Zampano's text, presented in Times font, occupies the centre of the page, with Truant's 
"commentary" appearing in Courier font in the margin at the bottom. As the book 
progresses, however, this initial layout becomes increasingly more complex and the 
division between the two texts less easily identifiable. 
What the reader of House of Leaves is presented with, then, is a scene of multiplied 
writings and readings, a palimpsest of densely overlaid inscriptions. Whereas the realist 
novel strives to repress its own materiality in order to offer the reader immediate access 
to "the real," what we have in Danielewski's novel is a chain of opaque material 
inscriptions, an interminable redoubling of text upon text. This redoubling undermines 
the ideal transparency of realism is favor of a reflexive interrogation into the very 
conditions of novelistic representation, subverting the notion of a stable, pre-existent 
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"reality" "out there" waiting to be portrayed and explained. Moreover, as Johnny reveals 
in his introduction, the Navidson documentary, which ostensibly set in motion the chain 
of supplementary inscriptions, may be nothing more than a hoax or chimera: 
[A]s I fast discovered, Zampano's entire project is about a film which doesn't 
even exist. You can look, I have, but no matter how long you search you will 
never find The Navidson Record in theatres or video stores. Furthermore, most of 
what's said by famous people has been made up. I tried contacting all of them. 
Those that took the time to respond told me they had never heard of Will 
Navidson let alone Zampano (xix-xx). 
What is more, Johnny also reports in the introduction that Zampano was "blind as a bat," 
and hence physically unable to perform the acts of description and analysis that 
nevertheless constitute the very substance of his commentary (xxi). Yet, despite both his 
handicap and the apparent non-existence of The Navidson Record, Zampano offers an 
exhaustive critical explication of the film, and his words in turn form the stimulus for 
later commentators to produce further readings. In effect, then, Zampano creates the film 
as a hypothetical object of study within the represented world at the same time as he 
merely purports to analyze it. 
Furthermore, Larry McCaffery and Sinda Gregory have drawn attention to the fact that 
Zampano is also the main character in Frederico Fellini's 1954 film La Strada, thus 
making him a fictional character within the fictional world of the novel. As they point 
out, once we recognize that Danielewski has "borrowed" this character from another 
work of fiction our perception of the novel's narrative structure is radically altered: 
Once we assume that the Zampano who wrote the novel in House of Leaves is 
literally the character Fellini created in La Strada, we are forced to revise our 
assumptions concerning the status of the world projected within Johnny Truant's 
framing narrative. That is, if Zampano is only an imaginary character existing in 
a work of art, then everything else in the framing tale involving Johnny 
including his mother, his (re)construction of the manuscript, and everything 
relating to the world in which this framing tale occurs - would necessarily also 
have to be 'unreal," even in the sense of the imaginary "real" posited in most 
works of fiction ("Haunted House" 126). 
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In short, the fictional and the real are so tightly enmeshed in House of Leaves that, as 
Mark B. N. Hansen puts it, "any effort to mark their separation is simply, for reasons of 
principle, impossible" ("The Digital Topography of Mark Z. Danielewski's House of 
Leaves" 601). 
As if in a bid to fill the referential void that lies at the heart of his project, Zampano 
produces literally hundreds of pages of detailed commentary on the Navidson film. That 
is, rather than resulting in simple absence, the apparent non-existence of The Navidson 
Record gives rise to a whole array of supplemental inscriptions that come to stand in for 
the striking absence of the referent itself. As Johnny's description of Zampano's 
manuscript makes plain, this process necessarily results in an unruly proliferation of 
texts: 
Endless snarls of words, sometimes twisting into meaning, sometimes into 
nothing at all, frequently breaking apart, always branching off into other pieces 
I'd come across later - on old napkins, the tattered edges of an envelope, once 
even on the back of a postage stamp; everything and anything but empty; each 
fragment completely covered with the creep of years and years of ink 
pronouncements; layered, crossed out, amended; handwritten, typed; legible, 
illegible; impenetrable, lucid; torn, stained, scotch taped; some bits crisp and 
clean, others faded, burnt or folded and refolded so many times the creases have 
obliterated whole passages of god knows what - sense? truth? deceit? (xvii). 
In his turn, Johnny not only edits Zampano's manuscript into a coherent document by 
restoring deletions, annotating foreign words, and arbitrating between competing 
passages, he seems impelled to add his own idiosyncratic inscriptions to the margins of 
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the text, composing letters, collages, sketches, photos, diagrams, and poems outlining the 
disturbing effects of the house on his personal life. And to this unruly assemblage of texts 
the anonymous editors add the further supplementary material found in the exhibits, 
appendices, and index, much of which is only tangentially related to the Navidson film. 
Appendix 2-E, for instance, contains over ten years worth of letters that Johnny's mother 
Pelafina Lievre wrote to her son during her stay in a mental institution, while appendix 2-
F offers a series of collaged quotations ranging from Homer, Rilke, and Pliny, to Sylvia 
Plath and The Epic of Gilgamesh. In short, each commentator demonstrates a marked 
inability to circumscribe the disseminating potential of their writings. Starting with 
Zampano's manuscript, the number of supplemental inscriptions proliferates 
exponentially outward, and as more and more disparate texts are drawn into its orbit, the 
text is gradually transformed into a labyrinth of overwhelming complexity. 
What this proliferation marks is the absence of any anchoring or foundational referent 
within the represented world that would otherwise serve to stabilize, delimit, and control 
the play of supplementary writing and representation. Put slightly differently, since the 
Navidson film does not in fact exist, it simply cannot compel a required or necessary 
reading of itself. That is, there is nothing intrinsic in the "film" (what to call this thing?) 
that the commentators have to respect or remain faithful to, nothing intrinsic that would 
otherwise serve to constrain the free play of supplementary representation. Consequently, 
at every stage in the chain of textual transmission the film is read and reread, written and 
rewritten, constructed in and sustained by the glosses to which it ostensibly gave rise. As 
such, there is no hierarchy of textual authority in House of Leaves. Precisely because it 
lacks the authority and force of an originary real-world referent, the Navidson film, and 
thus by extension each of the texts that come to stand in for its absence, remains open to a 
process of interpretive appropriation beyond any referentially-determined point of 
closure. Indeed, as we shall see, this interpretive openness ultimately extends to include 
the novel itself. 
So whereas the realist novel points back to a reality, offering itself as a mimetically 
faithful transcription of some pre-given and stable reality, in House of Leaves the referent 
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- the Navidson film - is established as a concept only, one that, and as N. Katherine 
Hayles cogently observes, emerges not behind but through the superimposition of several 
layers of textual inscription ("Saving the Subject" 779). As noted above, the first 
"reading" of The Navidson Record is instantiated in Zampano's manuscript of the same 
title, which effectively creates the film as an imaginary object of study within the 
represented world. Yet this manuscript, assembled into a coherent document from 
literally thousands of divergent fragments, is as much Johnny's production as it is 
Zampano's. Moreover, Johnny freely modifies Zampano's text in order to make it 
conform more nearly to his own experiences. For example, in an early scene of The 
Navidson Record Karen informs Will "[t]he water heater's on the fritz" (12). In his 
footnote to this passage, Johnny recounts how he was also obliged to take a cold shower 
earlier that morning due to a broken water heater. Johnny taunts the reader, asking if he 
or she thinks, "Is it just coincidence that this cold water predicament of mine also appears 
in this chapter?" "Not at all" he concedes, 
Zampano only wrote "heater." The word "water" back there [in the "The Navidson 
Record'l I added that. 
Now there's an admission, eh? 
Hey, no fair, you cry. 
Hey, hey, fuck you, I say" (16). 
Johnny's textual interventions, of which there is an indeterminate amount throughout the 
book, radically destabilize the integrity of "The Navidson Record", since the reader 
simply has no way of ascertaining which sections of the manuscript have been modified 
and which sections faithfully reproduced. Johnny's '"unauthorized" interventions thus 
implicate him as co-author of both Zampano's manuscript and the film that text 
"represents." What is more, the unnamed editors reportedly alter both Johnny and 
Zampano's texts. Consequently, the authenticity of every text in the novel is thrown into 
radical doubt. As Hansen succinctly puts it, "the novel insistently stages the futility of 
any effort to anchor the events it recounts in a stable recorded form" (602). 
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Thus liberated from the realist novel's "vocation as a means to stabilize, resurrect, and 
transmit the past, that is, to cash in a referential promise," Danielewski's novel becomes 
pre-eminently future-directed and reader-oriented (Hansen, 621). As Danielewski 
explains in an interview that needs quoting at length here, the whole point of his novel is 
to pose the challenge of interpretation to the reader: 
Let us say there is no sacred text here. That notion of authenticity or originality is 
constantly refuted. The novel doesn't allow the reader to ever say, "Oh, I see: this 
is the authentic, original text, exactly how it looked, what it always had to say." 
That's the irony of [Johnny's] mother's letters: at first you probably just assume 
that, okay, this is the real thing, but then the artifice of the way they look starts to 
undercut everything, so you're not sure. Pretty soon you begin to notice that at 
every level in the novel some act of interpretation is going on. The question is, 
why? Well, there are many reasons, but the most important one is that everything 
we encounter involves an act of interpretation on our part. And this doesn't just 
apply to what we encounter in books, but to what we respond to in life. Oh, we 
live comfortably because we create these sacred domains in our head where we 
believe that we have a specific history, a certain set of experiences. We believe 
that our memories keep us in direct touch with what has happened. But memory 
never puts us in touch with anything directly; it's always interpretive, reductive, a 
complicated compression of information. In House of Leaves you're always 
encountering texts where some kind of intrusion's taking place. The reason? No 
one - repeat no one is ever presented with the sacred truth, in books or in life. 
And so we must be brave and accept how often we make decisions without 
knowing everything. Of course, this poses a difficult question: can we retain that 
state of conscious unknowing and still act, or must we, in order to act, necessarily 
pretend to know? ("Haunted House" 121). 
In posing this interpretive challenge to the reader - that is, to generate a reading of the 
novel without any reliable textual evidence Danielewski seems to be consciously 
invoking Jacques Derrida's notion of the ''undecidability of the decision." (Danielewski's 
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familiarity with Derrida's work is evident throughout House of Leaves. Indeed, Derrida 
appears briefly as a character in the novel, in a hilarious scene where Karen questions 
him about the "meaning" of the enigmatic house). In an interview with Richard 
Beardsworth, Derrida offered the following succinct summation of his ideas on the 
problem of undecidability: 
However careful one is in the theoretical preparation of a decision, the instant of 
the decision, if there is to be a decision, must be heterogeneous to the 
accumulation of knowledge. Otherwise, there is no responsibility. In this sense 
not only must the person taking the decision not know everything ... the decision, 
if there is to be one, must advance towards a future which is not known, which 
cannot be anticipated ("Nietzsche and the Machine" 37). 
According to Derrida, the meaning of any text is inherently unstable and variable. Shot 
through with aporias and indeterminacies, every text carries within itself the seeds of its 
own deconstruction. The reader is thus unable to arrive at any immutably "correct" 
interpretation, unable to ever fully master or "[close] off the play" of the text (Writing 
and Difference 279). For Derrida, then, interpretive decisions themselves remain 
undecidable, always in a state of play, and this ensures that we will always fail to get 
texts under control, ensures that we will always mis-read texts and get them "wrong." 
For Derrida however, creative freedom lies in interpretive failure, in the impossibility 
of ever closing off the play of the text. In this sense, the constraint of interpretive 
decision-making foisted on the reader by the indeterminate text is always productive. In 
order to escape from the territory of the undecidable the reader must make a decision, and 
this decision necessarily realizes some possibilities latent in the text at the same time as it 
suppresses others. That is, only by making an ultimately arbitrary decision can freedom 
be gained. The quest for objective critical criteria inevitably leads to an infinite regress. 
Conversely, a critical decision that has not passed through what Derrida calls the "ordeal 
of the undecidable" would not constitute a free decision at all but merely a programmatic 
or administrative response ("The Force of Law" 24). For Derrida, the moment of the 
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decision is a moment of madness, a leap of faith in the dark. And it is precisely this 
"leap" that allows the reader to move beyond the unreadability of the text and into the 
adventurous country of readability. Without this undecidability, so Derrida argues, no 
reading as a singular act indeed, no genuine "reading" at all would be possible. This 
is because for Derrida it is this very freedom to read texts creatively, imaginatively, and 
"disobediently" that constitutes an actual "reading" of them at all, as opposed to an 
obedient, passive annotation. Any genuine reading, then, is necessary a mis-reading, and 
as such "meaning" can only be generated at the local level of the reader. In this way, new 
stories come into being1• 
As Danielewski makes plain in the passage cited above, everything in his complex 
novel - the non-existence of the film, Johnny's sustained interventions into the text, 
Zampano's status as a character in a Fellini movie and his uncanny ability, despite being 
blind, to review a film - functions in order to pose the challenge of interpretation to the 
reader. That is, he deliberately fills his text with epistemological paradoxes and aporias, 
thereby forcing the would-be interpreter to make a number of radically contingent and 
singular interpretive decisions that effectively imbricate the reader in the process of 
meaning-making in the text. With Johnny's reading as a model, the reader is encouraged 
to take the text as a point of departure, as a catalyst for his or her own "improvised" 
textual performances. Thus, although Danielewski does not wish to affix an authoritative 
meaning to his text, as Martin Brick observes, "he retains for himself the difficult task of 
making readers aware of their own participation in the text" ("Blueprint(s)", no 
pagination). Paradoxically enough, in House of Leaves it is only through the constraint of 
the undecidable decision that readerly freedom is activated. 
One metaphor the book offers for this process is that of riddle solving. For 
Danielewski, it would seem, the vast majority of riddles are unanswerable: 
1 For Derrida on the 'undecidability of the decision' see his "Remarks on Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism" and "Deconstructions: The 1m-possible." For politically oriented accounts of 
Derridean undecidability see Emesto LacIau's "Deconstruction, Pragmatism, Hegemony", and 
Keith Jenkins's Refiguring History: New Thoughts on an old Discipline (especially 23-25). 
Riddles: they either delight or torment. Their delight lies in solutions. Answers 
provide bright moments of comprehension perfectly suited for children who still 
inhabit a world where solutions are readily available ... The adult world, 
however, produces riddles of a different variety. They do not have answers and 
are often called enigmas or paradoxes. Still the old hint of the riddle's form 
corrupts these questions by re-echoing the most fundamental lesson: there must 
be an answer. From there comes torment (33). 
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The "torment" of the unanswerable riddle described here forms a perfect allegory for the 
"ordeal of the undecidable" experienced by readers during aporetic or decision-making 
moments. Just as release from such a moment comes only through a radically contingent 
and singular act of reading, so to, Danielewski suggests, the unanswerable riddle elicits 
from the reader a singular act of interpretation: ""Riddling" is an offshoot of "reading" 
calling to mind the participatory nature of that act - to interpret which is all the adult 
world has left when faced with the unsolvable" (33). Nevertheless, the crucial figure 
offered for the indeterminate text is that of the inextricable labyrinth, and the process of 
navigating the labyrinth thematized within the represented world supplies the correlate 
for the singular and unrepeatable act of reading the novel itself. 
House of Leaves as a Textual Labyrinth 
The unusual typographical experiments of House oj Leaves, more akin to concrete 
poetry than what one expects to find in the novel, calls to mind the famous Borges quote 
from "The Garden of Forking Paths": ''No one realized that the book and the labyrinth 
were one and the same" (Ficciones 54). As the novel's title makes plain, however, 
Danielewski would explicitly have us consider his book as architecture, a textual 
labyrinth that mirrors the warping dimensions ofNavidson's house. In the chapter known 
as "The Labyrinth," for instance, when the explorers are lost and disoriented amid the 
house's endless corridors and rooms, the layout of the text reflects this sense of 
disorientation. The number of footnotes begins to proliferate wildly and invade the main 
body of the text, creating word-columns that run sideways and upside-down, text-boxes 
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or "rooms" within the centre of the page, and encyclopedic lists that worm their way 
through the book like a spiral staircase. At another point, when Navidson is crawling 
down a shrinking tunnel, the amount of text on the pages gets progressively smaller; 
when he descends a stairwell, the text curls itself into a spiral, forcing the reader to 
slowly rotate the book. 
Significantly, the word "house" is printed throughout in blue ink, suggesting that this 
word functions similarly to an internet hyperlink. The implication is that by "clicking" on 
this word the reader will be transported to another part of the book, that the book alters its 
shape to accommodate the reader. The footnotes also continually direct the reader 
elsewhere within the text, forcing the reader to flip back and forth between the different 
chapters as well as between the "main" text and the appendices. As such, there are a large 
number of possible pathways through the book, as opposed to the singular left-to-right 
first-page-to-Iast linearity common to most works of fiction. Often the reader is presented 
with a choice between two divergent narrative pathways, and every decision the reader 
makes at these junctions necessarily alters their reading experience and perception of the 
novel as a whole. Perhaps the most significant of these is footnote 78 on page 72, which 
suggests the reader should tum to appendix 2-E and read the letters collected there by 
Johnny's mother, Pelafina. If the letters are read before resuming the narrative, the 
knowledge they impart significantly alters the reading experience, particularly one's 
perception of Johnny Truant. Not only does the reader begin to understand Johnny's 
peculiar psychology a little better, the reader is suddenly made aware of the fact that 
Johnny is a much more competent writer than he lets on. In his interview with 
Danielewski, Larry McCaffery recounts how the letters affected his own personal reading 
experience: 
[O]nce I finished her letters and returned to page 72, several things had occurred. 
First, it was now clearer to me that the author of this book had a much wider 
range of styles and voices than I had suspected up to that point. And second, 
throughout the rest of the novel, I was very aware that I now had a completely 
different perspective on Johnny Truant than if I had not turned from page 72 to 
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appendix I was quite literally reading a different book from the one most 
other readers would be reading ("Haunted House" 111-12). 
Thus, although House of Leaves may be read from first page to last, the reader is 
explicitly encouraged to navigate their own singular pathway through this immense 
labyrinth of a book, each reading offering a significantly different perspective of the 
events it recounts. 
Undecidability is part of Derrida's sustained attempt to trouble dualisms, or more 
precisely, to reveal how they are always already unstable and troubled. In Derrida's 
deconstructive readings, an undecidable is something that cannot conform to either 
polarity of a binary opposition. Prominent examples of these include ghost, pharmakon, 
and hymen, which, so Derrida argues, play between presence and absence, cure and 
poison, and inside and outside respectively. To this list ofundecidables, we might add the 
labyrinth. While discussing Navidson's spatially warped house, Zampano quotes the 
following passage from Penelope Reed Doob's The Idea of the Labyrinth from Classical 
Antiquity through the Middle Ages: 
[M]aze-treaders, whose vision ahead and behind is severely constricted and 
fragmented, suffer confusion, whereas maze-viewers who see the pattern whole, 
from above or in a diagram, are dazzled by its complex artistry. What you see 
depends on where you stand, and thus, at one and the same time, labyrinths are 
single (there is one physical structure) and double: they simultaneously 
incorporate order and disorder, clarity and confusion, unity and multiplicity, 
artistry and chaos .... Our perception of labyrinths is thus intrinsically unstable: 
change your perspective and the labyrinth seems to change (114). 
Although not cited in House of Leaves, elsewhere in her book Doob explicitly links the 
undecidability of labyrinthine structure with Derrida's notion of the textual aporia: "the 
concept of aporia (the "unpassable path," self-contradiction, paradox) sheds light on the 
labyrinth's embodiment of paradox, its simultaneous affirmation of antinomies: 
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order/chaos, imprisonment/liberation, linearity/circularity, clarity/complexity, 
stability/instability" (8-9). In this sense, Navidson's house-labyrinth furnishes a 
particularly apt figure for the novel itself, a textual labyrinth within which the reader is 
forced at every turn to negotiate or "decide" unsolvable aporias and indeterminacies. 
Since, as Doob points out, "error is inherent in the maze's structure," so the 
interpretive decisions made within are necessarily fallible (250). Nevertheless, if "perfect 
knowledge (and therefore perfect action) is impossible" from within, once the labyrinth is 
penetrated and seen from above its perceived chaos and disorder are converted into 
dazzling artistry and redemptive form (Doob 248-49). But as Zampano points out in one 
of the novel's most self-reflexive passages, even the "dichotomy between those who 
participate inside and those who view from the outside breaks down when considering 
[Navidson's] house, simply because no one ever sees the labyrinth in its entirety" (114). 
"Therefore," he goes on to conclude, "comprehension of its intricacies must always be 
derived from within" (114). This predicament is also true of the reader's engagement 
with House of Leaves. In one of his many direct addresses to the reader, Johnny wams us 
that the book we hold in our hands is so vast and labyrinthine that we may not be able to 
free ourselves from it. The house will consume you, Johnny cautions, just as his efforts to 
make coherent sense of Zampano's manuscript rendered him an obsessive, nervous 
wreck. And in the first of many instances in the novel, Johnny suggests that a singular act 
of reading is the only available means of escape from the agony of the undecidable 
house: "Old shelters television, magazines, movies won't protect you anymore. You 
might try scribbling in a journal, on a napkin, maybe even in the margins of this book" 
(xxiii). 
Danielewski takes pains to underscore the absolute inaccessibility of full knowledge, 
the utter impossibility of gaining a stable vantage point from above the textual labyrinth 
where its meaning and pattern may be discerned. In other words, he warns readers against 
searching for some essential "meaning" behind his book. Zampano notes that one sure 
way to escape any maze is "to simply keep one hand on a wall and walk in one direction. 
Eventually the exit will be found" (115). In the case of Navidson's house, however, this 
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method would "probably require an infinite amount of time and resources" (115). What 
Danielewski seems to be suggesting here is that, like the explorers in the labyrinth, the 
reader simply cannot exhaust every possible meaning of the text, and thus can only ever 
trace an utterly singular pathway through the immense labyrinth of the novel: "It cannot 
be forgotten that the problem posed by exhaustion a result of labor is an inextricable 
part of any encounter with a sophisticated maze. In order to escape then, we have to 
remember we cannot ponder all paths but must decode only those necessary to get out. 
We must be quick and anything but exhaustive" (115). 
This passage by Zampano (or is that Danielewski?) seems to be deliberately echoing 
John Barth's discussion of Borges in his celebrated essay "The Literature of Exhaustion": 
Now, not just any old body is equipped for this labor; Theseus in the Cretan 
labyrinth becomes in the end the aptest image of Borges after all. Distressing as 
the fact is to us liberal democrats, the commonalty, alas, will always lose their 
way and their soul; it is the chosen remnant, the virtuoso, the Thesean hero, who, 
confronted with Baroque reality, Baroque history, the Baroque state of his art, 
need not rehearse its possibilities to exhaustion, any more than Borges needs 
actually write the Encyclopedia of non or the books in the Library of Babel. He 
need only be aware of their existence or possibility, acknowledge them, and with 
the aid of very special gifts - as extraordinary as saint- or herohood ... go straight 
through the maze to the accomplishment of his work (75-76). 
The evocation of Borges here is particularly apt since he, perhaps more than any other 
postmodem writer, equated the singular act of reading with that of writing. What I am 
arguing here constitutes the only possible response and means of escape from textual 
labyrinths. Borges's story "Pierre Menard, author of Don Quixote" is perhaps his most 
famous allegory of the singular, or more accurately, unrepeatable act of reading. In this 
story, Menard reproduces several fragments of Cervantes's novel word for word. Because 
of the changed cultural context, however, these fragments are imbued with meanings not 
present in the original, as if it is the singular encounter between the modem reader and 
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book that gives the text its meaning. Borges's story underscores the uniqueness and 
unrepeatability of every act of reading, even if that reading merely repeats a canonical 
text verbatim2• 
For Danielewski, the process of interpretation, or more accurately, the radically 
contingent, singular act of reading, is all that the reader has left when faced with the 
unsolvable, labyrinthine text: 
Unfortunately, the anfractuosity of some labyrinths may actually prohibit a 
permanent solution. More confounding still, its complexity may exceed the 
imagination of even the designer. Therefore anyone lost within must recognize 
that no one, not even a god or an Other, comprehends the entire maze and so 
therefore can never offer a definitive answer. Navidson's house seems a perfect 
example. Due to the wall-shifts and extraordinary size, any way out remains 
singular and applicable only to those on that path at that particular time. All 
solutions then are necessarily personal (115). 
Furthermore, Navidson's and the explorers' navigation of the house allegorizes the 
reader's personal navigation and concretization of the textual labyrinth. Because of the 
constant wall-shifts, each individual expedition into the house is quite literally a personal 
and singular experience. Zampano observes that the same path can never be taken twice: 
"While some portions of the house, like the Great Hall for instance, seem to offer a 
communal experience, many inter-communicating passageways encountered by 
individual members, even with only a glance, will never be re-encountered by anyone 
else again" (118). On his second journey, Navidson trails a fishing line behind himself in 
order to retrace his steps, yet this line is either snapped or mysteriously absorbed by the 
2 In yet another iteration of Cervantes's text, Zampano cites Menard's fragments in his chapter on 
echoes, claiming to have meet Menard in a Paris cafe after the second world war (42). And like 
the narrator of Borges's story, Zampano' compares Menard's fragment on the nature of history to 
Cervantes's "original," concluding that "Menard's nuances are so fine they are nearly 
undetectable, though talk with the framer and you will immediately see how haunted they are by 
sorrow, accusation, and sarcasm," to which Johnny adds the following footnote: "Exactly! How 
the fuck do you write about 'exquisite variation' when both passages are exactly the same?" (42). 
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house. The wall-shifts preclude any possibility of definitively mapping that place. The 
singular journeys of individuals into the house thus mirror within the text the singular 
and, for Danielewski as for Borges, unrepeatable act of navigating or reading any text. 
In the fundamental absence of light, the house serves as a kind of resonator onto which 
the explorers of the house, viewers of the film, and readers of Zampano's manuscript are 
encouraged to project their own fears and anxieties. For Navidson, the house invokes a 
number of personal demons. Chief among these is the guilt he feels for photographing a 
dying Sudanese child, a photo that won him the Pulitzer Prize and considerable fame. 
Zampano quotes one Dr Then Van Poll it, who claims that the house's mutations "were 
merely manifestations of [Navidson's] own troubled psyche" (21). Elsewhere, Zampano 
cites a "Dr Haugeland" who "asserts that the extraordinary absence of sensory 
information forces the individual to manufacture his or her own data", while Ruby Dahl 
call the house "a solipsistic heightener" in which "the house, the halls, and the rooms all 
become the self - collapsing, expanding, tilting, closing, but always in perfect relation to 
the mental state of the individual" (165). Here, the propensity of the house to reflect the 
mental state of the individual correlates with the idea that the "meaning" of the novel is 
itself constructed through the reader's singular navigation of the text. 
As Martin Brick observes, "[t]he darkness of the house is an unstable signifier ... 
resonator of whatever fear or meaning the reader chooses to attach to it" ("Blueprint(s)" 
no pagination). In this perspective, perhaps the most significant instance of interior 
duplication occurs on page 143, where the blue box occupies the upper potion of the page 
(Figure 1). 
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I : The Blue Box 
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Interior duplication is a moment wherein the mechanisms of the text and the associated 
operations of reading are mirrored within the text in miniature. As a miniature replica of 
the text, interior duplication draws the reader's attention to some important element of 
the texts formal mechanisms. The blue box is one such instance. As Hayles has pointed 
out, blue is the color of the backing screens used in film production. With the magic of 
cinematography and special effects, the blue screen can accommodate virtually any 
image the filmmaker dreams up. Since the novel is so heavily involved with film, Hayles 
rightly suggests that this blue box, and thus by extension the novel itself, can be 
considered as a screen or site of projection foregrounding the reader's participation in the 
construction of the text's meaning ("Saving the Subject" 793). This screen functions as a 
site for the project of textual worlds. Just as the filmmaker projects flickering new 
cinematic worlds upon the blue screen of film production, so too the reader of House of 
Leaves is invited to project their own textual worlds onto the "screen" of the page. The 
primarily way in which Danielewski draws our attention to this is through the figure of 
Johnny Truant and his interaction with Zampano's text. 
Readerly Projection 
Vladimir: What do [the leaves] say? 
Estragon: They talk about their lives. 
Vladimir: To have lived is not enough for them. 
Estragon: They have to talk about it. 
Beckett, Waitingfor GodoP 
The problem of reading that Johnny encounters in his efforts to make sense of 
Zampano's manuscript doubles our own when confronted by Danielewski's problematic 
text. For as Danielewski explains in an interview, by incorporating his personal history 
into the text, Johnny serves as a model for how he wants his readers to approach the 
book: 
3 This epigraph is stolen from, or mediated via way of, Joseph Dewey's article "Rick Moody." 
The way that Johnny projects himself into, or onto, Zampan6's book shows how 
the text of The Navidson Record functions as it is being read and assembled by 
the readers themselves. Johnny even goes so far as to modify it. Not only does 
the book permit that, it is really saying to the reader, "Now you modify it." That 
invitational aspect of the book at least has been very successful. I've received a 
lot of feedback from readers who have responded by telling me about their 
anxieties and why the book evoked these for them ... [S]o the next question is, 
"Why does that make you uncomfortable? What specifically makes that sense of 
falling uncomfortable to you?" Right there you're on the threshold of a whole 
series of stories that the book has allowed you to access but that are, at the same 
time, particular to you ("Haunted House" 120). 
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Here, again, Danielewski underscores the future-directed and reader-oriented dimension 
of his book. In the process of editing Zampano's manuscript, Johnny makes a number of 
alterations to the text. Furthermore, he appends his own supplemental texts to its margins 
that revolve around the problem of meaning: how it is to be determined and understood, 
how we set about making sense of lives or texts despite the apparent senselessness of it 
all. Prompted by the events of the film, Johnny reviews his past in a bid to uncover a 
sense of coherence in his life. In the same interview, Danielewski goes to state: "I should 
say intellectual engagement has never been my primary goal. Important, but not primary. 
Rather I've always wanted to create scenes and scenarios that verge on the edge of 
specificity without crossing into identification, leaving enough room, so to speak, for the 
reader to participate and supply her own fears, his own anxieties, their own history and 
future" ("Haunted House" 119-120). The reader, then, is quite explicitly invited to project 
him or herself onto the text in the same way Johnny projects himself onto Zampano's, to 
add their own dark etchings to its margins and many white spaces, to approach it (to crib 
a phrase from Joseph Dewey) as a kind of Beckettian "notebook-qua-talisman" ("Rick 
Moody" 8). 
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Furthermore, not only does Johnny's reading serve as a model for the reader, but his 
pointless quest to locate the Navidson house functions as an allegory warning readers on 
the futility of any attempt to uncover within the novel a foundational reality behind or 
beyond the play of supplementary writing and representation. For it is precisely the 
absence of any authoritative real-world referent that would otherwise serve to stabilize 
and control the play of supplementary inscription that allows Johnny - and thus by 
extension the reader the interpretive freedom to project their own desires and fantasies 
onto the text. Put slightly differently, in the absence of a controlling referent, every text 
within the novel remains open to a process of interpretive appropriation beyond any 
logical point of curtailment. Nevertheless, in full knowledge of the fact that the Navidson 
film is a fiction, Johnny sets out in search of the house, as if hoping that evidence 
verifying its existence will somehow dispel "the terrible sense of relatedness" he feels 
toward Zampano's manuscript and ground the proliferation of texts in a "recognizable" 
reality (326). The impossible house, however, never in fact existed; rather it was only 
ever part of an imaginary film that Johnny himself had a hand in creating. Similarly, for 
readers of House of Leaves there simply is no appealing to a traditional concept of 
novelistic mimesis that would point back to some grounding referent or reality beyond 
the mere play of textual inscription. Inevitably, then, Johnny returns from his quest 
disappointed, have failed to locate Navidson's house. But it is precisely this failure that 
allows Johnny to appropriate Zampano's manuscript for his own purposes: "Virginia 
[where the house is ostensibly located] may have meant a great deal to Zampano's 
imagination. It doesn't to mine. I'm following something else. Maybe parallel. Possibly 
harmonic. Certainly personal" (502). 
Thus, freed from the strictures of mimetic faithfulness and interpretive truth, Johnny's 
"commentary" becomes less an objective, scholarly analysis of Zampano's manuscript 
and more a manifestly autobiographical text set on exploring his own personal reactions 
to the house. Indeed, the unique form of the "The Navidson Record" its seemingly 
incomplete state, its blanks and elisions, its multiple reading paths allows for any 
number of supplemental readings, thus demonstrating how the gaps in real history 
become opportune occasions for appropriation and invention. In editing the manuscript, 
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Johnny must fill in these gaps and indeterminacies, decide whether to restore or 
"resurrect" deletions, and arbitrate between variant readings of the same passages (111). 
In the process, he begins to project his own textual worlds onto the page: 
(Now that I think about it, I guess I've always gravitated towards written legacies 
(private lands surrounded by great bewildering oceans (a description I don't 
entirely understand even as I write it down now (though the sense of adventure 
about words (that little "I" making so little difference), appeals to me - ah but to 
hell with the closing parent)he)see)s) (sic) (379). 
Through Johnny's acts of interpretation and invention, Danielewski's novel thematizes 
Gerard Genette's observation that "the time of literary works is not the definite time of 
writing, but the indefinite time of reading and of memory. The meaning of books is 
before them, not behind them" (cited in David Packman's The Structure of Literary 
Desire 13). For Danielewski, a text's meaning is generated in the encounter between 
reader and book, where meaning is made and remade in a process beyond any logical 
point of curtailment. The passage above neatly brings this point home: Johnny is unable 
to close even this single sentence. 
By underscoring the absence of the real behind the various textual inscriptions, 
Danielewski's novel moves beyond the anxieties commonly associated with the loss of 
the real and into a casual acceptance of simulation. In a universe where there is no 
grounding reality, norm, or standard to deviate from, readers both within and without the 
novel's frame are free to project their own idiosyncratic textual worlds onto the blue-
screen of the house. Of course, the anxiety deftly sidestepped here is a major issue in 
much postmodem literature. Maurice Couturier traces this characteristic theme back to 
Thomas Pynchon's seminal novel The Crying of Lot 49. Drawing on the ideas of Jean 
Baudrillard, Couturier argues that this work constitutes the first novelistic allegory on the 
theme of simulation and the liquidation of the referential value oflanguage: 
Oedipa Maas thinks that everything is real in her California until she is lured 
into the shadow world of the Tristero with its shadow communication system. 
She becomes gradually aware of what Jean Baudrillard calls the "agony of the 
powerful referents, the agony of the real and the rational," an agony that is 
precipitated by the proliferation of the media and the techniques of simulation. 
She would like to stop this proliferation, but, in order to do so, she must first 
rediscover the authentic text hidden beneath the surface of everyday reality. Her 
crusade lamentably fails, because she keeps unearthing more and more texts that 
duplicate reality and make the "real" more elusive. Her quest is circular: the 
"real" she is looking for is, of course, her elusive self ("Nabokov in 
postmodernist land" 256). 
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Conversely, House of Leaves freely admits its simulacral "foundation" in order to 
foreground the active role the reader plays in concretizing and creating the novelistic 
world. Like Oedipa, Johnny attempts to uncover indexical evidence of the Navidson 
film's existence, which if found would halt the escalation of texts. What he discovers, 
however, is an infinite regress of texts such that the referent, if it in fact existed at all, has 
long since been lost beyond recall. But rather than resulting in despair, the fundamental 
absence of the real behind the simulations allows Johnny the freedom to rewrite the text 
and project his own textual worlds onto Zampano manuscript, and this is precisely what 
Danielewski expects his readers to do. 
In other words, since everything in this novel of mediations lacks any sure foundation 
or grounding referent that would otherwise give the various simulations the force and 
status of the indexical, the various texts, and ultimately, the novel itself, can only acquire 
a sense of conviction through producing reality affects in the reader, that is, through the 
reader's singular and personalized reading of the text (Hansen 621). As Hansen 
succinctly puts it, 
Far more important ... than the epistemological hurdles [the novel offers up] is 
the ontological indifference underlying them and the definitive departure that it 
signals away from the tired postmodern agonies bound up with the figure of 
simulation. It is as if mediation has become so ubiquitous and inexorable in the 
world of the novel (which is, after all, our world too) as simply to be reality, to be 
the bedrock upon which out investment and belief in the real can be built (601). 
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Indeed, on the very first page of his commentary, Zampano suggests that his readers 
forgo issues of referentiality and focus instead simply on what is in the text and what this 
may mean for the individual reader: "Though many continue to devote substantial time 
and energy to the antimonies of fact or fiction, representation or artifice, documentary or 
prank, as of late the more interesting material dwells exclusively on the interpretation of 
events within the film. This direction seems more promising, even if the house itself, like 
Melville's behemoth, remains resistant to summation" (3). Therefore, through the critical 
imperative to give up on the referent and simply accept the nature of the text as 
simulacrum allegorized in Johnny Truant's pointless quest for the impossible house, 
Danielewski's novel comes to form a perfect illustration of Brian McHale's definition of 
the postmodernist text: "The dead-ending of epistemology in solipsism can be 
transcended, but only by shifting from a modernist poetics of epistemology to a 
postmodernist poetics of ontology, from Oedipa's anguished cry, "Shall I project a 
world?," to the unconstrained projection of worlds in the plural" (Postmodernist Fiction 
25). 
In House of Leaves there simply is no appealing to a traditional novelistic concept of 
mimesis that would point back to some foundational reality behind the play of textual 
inscription. The Navidson documentary, the ostensible referent behind Zampano's and 
Johnny's inscriptions, is a mere idea only, a catalyst for a proliferating series a texts that 
create the film as a putative object through a perpetual redoubling of text upon text. Here, 
the referent (if we may call it that) does not so much stand at the beginning of a train of 
secondary representations as it does at the end, emerging gradually through the process of 
representation rather than anchoring it. 
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This situation is very similar to what, in Dissemination, Derrida finds in Mallarme's 
prose-poem "Mimique." According to Derrida, in this text Mallarme has hit upon an 
excellent alternative to Platonic mimesis. Based on a mime in which the performer was 
required to improvise a kind of gestural writing imitating nothing, Mallarme composes or 
improvises a short text. Mallarme, however, never saw the original performance, he only 
read about it in a booklet after the event. Thus rather than mimetically describing the 
mime's performance, Mallarme's text mimics, so Derrida argues, the idea of the mime's 
performance that is, to produce a gestural writing with no prior modal or authentic 
source to fall back on. In this way, Mallarme is faithful to the mime's performance, but 
not in any mimetic sense in which he could be said to have accurately reproduced the 
original. 
We are faced then with mimicry imitating nothing .... There is no simple 
reference. It is in this that the mime's operation does not allude, but alludes to 
nothing .... Mallarme [in "Mimique"] thus preserves the differential structure of 
mimicry or mimesis, but without its Platonic or metaphysical interpretation, 
which implies that somewhere the being of something that is, is being imitated. 
Mallarme even maintains (and maintains himself in) the structure of the 
phantasma as it is defined by Plato: the simulation as the copy of a copy. With 
the exception that there is no longer any model, and hence no copy (cited in 
Gregory L. Ulmer "The Object of Post-Criticism" 92). 
A similar dynamic is overtly operative in Danielewski's novel. Since The Navidson 
Record does not exist as a verifiable object within the represented world, Zampano's 
commentary on the film is a mere simulation of a commentary that creates, describes, and 
narrates the film at the same time as it analyzes it. Also significant in this regard is 
Zampano decision to create an imaginary film. As Gregory Ulmer points out, "[0 ]nce one 
realizes that the mime emblematizes (for Derrida) mechanical reproduction, it becomes 
apparent that representation without reference is a description of the way film or tape 
functions as a "language," ... mechanical reproduction removes or lifts sights and sounds 
from their contexts [and] de-motivates them, hence the loss of reference, the 
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undecidability of allusion" (92). One might venture to suggest, then, that even if the 
documentary film existed, its mechanical means of re-production would still result in the 
loss of the referent4 • 
In this notes to the manuscript, Johnny does not attempt to recuperate the film through 
the values and assumptions of mimesis so much as he endeavours to mimic the way 
Zampano created, from scratch as it were, a fictive narrative and presented it as fact. In 
his first extended footnote, Johnny retells a hilarious story he told the night before to a 
group of girls he was trying to impress while out at a bar. He recounts for the reader how 
he improvised the story: 
4 In contrast to Derrida and Ulmer, Hansen stresses the referential power of mechanical 
reproduction. For Hansen, orthographic recording (literally, "straight writing") designates the 
capacity of various technologies such as photography, film, and magnetic tape - to register an 
exact inscription of "the real" ("The Digital Topography of Mark Z. Danielewski's House of 
Leaves" 603). The "orthographic force" of such technologies stems precisely from their technical 
(or chemical) means of inscription, which makes possible the literal copy or transcription of 
events. Technical recording, in other words, "insulates the past, the "that has been," even as it 
allows for its re-presentification" (605). Hansen, citing Roland Barthes, argues that the 
orthographic faculty finds its fullest realization in the evidentiary punch of photography and film. 
In contrast to writing and painting, Barthes argues, photographic inscription furnishes indexical 
evidence of a referent's existence: "I call "photographic referent" not the optionally real thing to 
which an image or sign refers but the necessarily real thing which has been placed before the 
lens, without which there would be no photograph .... [I]n Photography I can never deny that the 
thing has been there" (603). Orthographic recording technologies, and in particular photography 
and film, register exact inscriptions of events in a way that brings "together reality and the past" -
something realist literature aspires to but simply cannot achieve in this strict, literal sense (603). 
Nevertheless, the house on Ash Tree lane emerges as ontologically alien to the principle of 
orthographic recording. Indeed, its entrance into the world of the film is immediately heralded by 
a failure of technical orthography. Initially, Navidson's film is a straightforward documentary of 
his family's new life in the country: a modest project that poses no problems for orthographic 
recording. According to Zampano's summation, the film opens with "pristine glimpses of the 
Virginia countryside, the rural neighbourhood, purple hills born on the fringe of night" (9), before 
moving on to domestic scenes of the family settling into their new home. The referential value of 
the house, however, is immediately uncut when the family return from a brief holiday to find that 
a new door has mysteriously appeared in the living room. Zampano describes how Navidson 
plays back the Hi 8 tapes to find out who or what caused the alteration, and discovers that the 
cameras have failed to register the change: "[T]he motion sensors were never triggered. Only 
their exit and re-entrance exists on tape. Virtually a week seamlessly elided, showing us the 
family as they depart from a house without that strange interior space present only to return a 
fraction of a second later to find it already in place" (28). 
"Very well," I said, starting then to recall for everyone how at the lonely age of 
nineteen I had climbed off a barge in Galveston. "Actually I escaped," I 
improvised. "See, I still owed my crazy Russian Captain a thousand dollars for a 
wager I'd lost in Singapore. He wanted to murder me so I practically had to run 
the whole way to Houston" (13). 
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What follows is a tall story involving an underground kickboxing club, a load of 
smuggled drugs, and five crates full of exotic birds, all of which ends with Johnny in 
Florida "nearly dying in a cold water place called Devil's Ear" (15). On a first reading, 
this seemingly irrelevant story seems to have little connection to the content of 
Zampano's opening chapter, which discusses the "antinomies of fact or fiction" 
surrounding the Navidson film. However, it soon becomes that, rather than simply adding 
his own opinion on the veracity of the film, Johnny is creating in the margins a parallel 
text that mimics the thematics of Zampano text. In improvising his ludicrous story and 
pitching it as fact, Johnny mimics in a different register Zampano story of the impossible 
house in the form of a "critical commentary." Thus Johnny is in this sense faithful to 
Zampano's text, although not a mimetic faithful that purports to reproduce its original. In 
turn, Danielewski's reader is invited to repeat this "aboriginal swerve from origins, since 
the text ... can give no assurance of anything more solidly grounded than a play of 
multiplied textual inscriptions" (Christopher Norris, Derrida 50-51). 
Nevertheless, despite the fundamental equality of all texts in the face of the absence of 
the real, Johnny and Zampano are locked in a struggle for textual control, each trying to 
assert mastery over the other. This relationship, however, is inherently unstable; both 
writers negotiate their respective positions in an endless game of musical chairs. On the 
one hand, there is a sense in which Johnny creates Zampano by editing or remediating the 
old man's text into a coherent document, and in this sense, Johnny has textual control. On 
the other hand, there are times when Johnny feels that Zampano is speaking through him 
or directing him, investing him with memories and associations that are not his own. 
Moreover, Zampano often addresses Johnny directly, and this destabilizes the idea that 
Johnny has ontological priority as the editor of the dead man's manuscript: 
More and more often, I've been overcome by the strangest feeling that I've 
gotten it all turned around, by which I mean to say-to state the not-so-
obvious-without it I would perish. A moment comes when suddenly everything 
seems impossibly far and confused, my sense of self derealized & 
depersonalized, the disorientation so severe I actually believe--and let me tell 
you it is an intensely strange instance of belief-that this terrible sense of 
relatedness to Zampano' s work implies something that just can't be, namely that 
this thing has created me; not me unto it, but now it unto me, where I am nothing 
more than the matter of some other voice, intruding through the folds of what 
even now lies there agape, possessing me with histories I should never recognize 
as my own; inventing me, defining me, directing me until finally every 
association I can claim as my own ... is relegated to nothing; forcing me to face 
the most terrible suspicion of all, that all of this has just been made up and 
what's worse, not made up by me or even for that matter Zampano. 
Though by whom I have no idea (326). 
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In this reading, then, Zampano is in controL Moreover, Johnny's sense that he is being 
made up by someone else indicates that Danielewski, the author of this book, is himself 
drawn in to the merry-go-round of substitution. Thus, as Hayles writes, "[t]hese 
connections make clear that the book refuses to lie quiescent in its 'binding tomb.' Just as 
the House walls endlessly rearrange themselves, so the ontological distinctions that 
separate Navidson from Zampano, Zampano from Johnny, Johnny from Danielewski, and 
Danielewski from the reader keep shifting and changing" ("Saving the Subject" 801). By 
extension, then, the reader herself is drawn into novel's transferential drama. 
Danielewski gives the volatile relationship between Johnny and Zampano concrete 
expression in the image of the brass bull, an instrument of torture inside which victims 
are caged: 
Zampano is trapped but where may surprise you. He's trapped inside me, and 
what's more he's fading, I can hear him, just drifting off, consumed within, 
digested I suppose ... his voice has gotten even fainter, still echoing in the 
chambers of my heart, sounding those eternal tones of grief, though no longer 
playing the pipes in my head. I can see myself clearly. I am in a black room. My 
belly is brass and I am hollow. I am engulfed in flame and suddenly very afraid 
(338). 
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Paradoxically, both Johnny and Zampano are figured simultaneously as the bull 
encapsulating the other, and the victim encapsulated by the other. The desired control 
slides elusively back and forth between the two, since neither one is able to finally 
position themselves as the source of the other's words. 
House of Leaves as a Textual Assemblage 
A book is more than a verbal structure or series of verbal structures; it is the 
dialogue it establishes with its reader ... A book is not an isolated being: it is a 
relationship, an axis of innumerable relationships. 
Borges 
I now want to expand my discussion of House of Leaves to look at Danielewski's 
reconfiguration of the standard concept of the 'Book'. Hayles argues that in Johnny's 
(re)construction of Zampano's text his "determination to make the book stay decently 
under its covers, figured as a kind of death that will render the text safely inert, is 
subverted by the links to Johnny in Zampano's narrative, an inversion of inside-outside" 
thus warning readers that House of Leaves itself cannot "be bound so that its leaves will 
not spill out of their container" ("Saving the Subject" 799). The problem with any 
thematic or phenomenological interpretation, however, lies precisely in its effort to 
circumscribe and contain these disturbing effects of writing. 
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The reading I offer above, for instance, constitutes House of Leaves as a polyphonic 
text focused on the continuous problematization of anything like full meaning through a 
complex mirroring and overlaying of textual inscriptions. Danielewski's novel, I suggest, 
demonstrates how the interpretative impulse to contain and demarcate a set of words that 
constitutes a singular and unified "work" is continually thwarted by the disseminating 
potential of writing. In reconstituting these unruly effects of writing as the novel's core 
themes, however, the totalizing process of interpretation ultimately points to some 
interpretative truth over and above the play of textual inscriptions. So if we are not 
simply going to "repeat that gesture of containment by which commentary seeks to close 
off the play of textual inscriptions and restore writing to an order of self-present truth" 
(Christopher Norris, Derrida 58), we shall need a reading strategy that factors in or 
better, helps produce the various ways House of Leaves enacts a concept of the book as 
a Deleuze and Guattarian "textual assemblage", that is to say, a "multiplicity of 
nonidentity" . 
The following "rhizomatic" reading is indebted to Robert Briggs's pragmatic (and 
playful) critical application of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's theorization of the 
book as "textual assemblage". In his article, Briggs produces Paul Auster's The New York 
Trilogy (1988) as a textual assemblage, thereby providing a useful working model with 
which to analyze literary texts that refuse to remain "safely inert" within the binding 
covers of a book. I have therefore adopted a similar theoretical position from which to 
analyse the problem of the book that House of Leaves poses. It is hoped this rhizomatic 
reading will provide a structurally necessary supplement to the (provisional, necessarily 
fictional) thematic interpretation above. 
The idea offiction5 as nonidentity, Briggs argues, is essential to Deleuze and Guattari's 
re-conceptualization of the 'book' in the famous 'Rhizome' chapter of A Thousand 
Plateaus: "[f]or Deleuze and Guattari ... a book is not something that can be definitively 
identified, which is to say, reduced to a form of identity ... [t]he very substance of the 
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book is what disrupts the processes of identification, what refuses a unity" ("Wrong 
Numbers" 214). Briggs's quotation from Deleuze and Guattari is worth reproducing here: 
A book has neither object nor subject; it is made of variously formed matters, and 
very different dates and speeds. To attribute the book to a subject is to overlook 
this working of matters, and the exteriority of their relations. [ ... ] In a book, as in 
all things, there are lines of articulation or segmentarity, strata and territories; but 
also lines of flight, movements of deterritorialization and destratification. [ ... ] All 
this, lines and measurable speeds, constitute an assemblage. A book is an 
assemblage of this kind, and as such is unattributable. It is a multiplicity but we 
don't know yet what the multiple entails when it is no longer attributed, that is, 
after it has been elevated to the status of a substantive. [ ... A book is continually] 
attributing to itself subjects that it leaves with nothing more than a name as the 
trace of an intensity. [ ... ] Here, as elsewhere, the units of measure are what is 
essential: quantify writing. There is no difference between what a book talks 
about and how it is made. Therefore a book has no object. As an assemblage, a 
book has only itself, in connection with other assemblages [ ... ] We will never ask 
what a book means, as signified or signifier; we will not look for anything to 
understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in connection with what other 
things it does or does not transmit intensities, in which other multiplicities its own 
are inserted and metamorphosed. (214, quotation slightly modified) 
What is important for our purposes here is that the 'book' is no longer seen as an 
organic unity or a clearly delineated totality possessing an intrinsic identity; on the 
contrary, fiction is the very condition of non identity. Moreover, as an assemblage 
consisting of multiple components which forms a part of other assemblages, a book can 
no longer be conceptualized as a "container" precisely because it is "full of holes through 
which connections can be made to others" (214). Thus, Briggs argues, "[o]ne ... is 
entirely the wrong number for a book, which is always simultaneously more than one (a 
5 Briggs explains that he privileges the tenn 'fiction' rather than 'literature' "because it more 
easily enables an association of literariness with the order(s) of non identity, whereas a certain 
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multiplicity) and less than one (a part)" (215). Following Deleuze and Guattari, Briggs 
claims that certain ways of reading and interpretation that insist on identifying the book 
as singular, as one, ''whether it be through the attribution of an interiority, an ontology, an 
origin, a destination" (215), are symptomatic of an "arborescent", as opposed to 
"rhizomatic" model of thought. Arborescent thought "imposes the verb 'to be', but the 
fabric of the rhizome is the conjunction, 'and ... and ... and ... "', a conjunction which 
"carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb 'to be' " (215). 
Where are you going? Where are you coming from? What are you heading for? 
These are totally useless questions. Making a clean slate, starting or beginning 
again from ground zero, seeking a beginning or a foundation - all imply a false 
conception of voyage and movement [ ... ]. But [ ... there is] another way of 
traveling and moving: proceeding from the middle, through the middle, coming 
and going rather than starting and finishing. American literature, and already 
English literature [ ... ] know how to move between things, establish a logic of the 
AND, overthrow ontology, do away with foundations, nullify endings and 
beginnings (215). 
The problem of the book then, Briggs argues, "might be addressed better by Paul 
Auster's The New York Trilogy ... than by a practice of (philosophical) thought or writing 
that is governed by identity" (216). One might suppose Briggs selected The New York 
Trilogy because Auster's work has commonly been read as a fiction primarily concerned 
with the problem of identity. Such a reading however, despite focusing on the problem of 
identity, still constitutes an arborescent reading insofar as it attempts to uncover what 
Auster's book is about, still a reading "in terms of beginnings and ends", a reading in 
quest of "themes, intentions, and other forms of interiority" that would impart a sense of 
unity to the work6• "From within the strictures of this system," Briggs points out "it 
makes little difference whether what is identified is the continuity of theme, story, and 
concept ofliterature would figure literature as an order of truth" (223). 
6 Incidentally, Auster is mentioned in House of Leaves as the author of a "short internal 
monologue" dramatising Karen Green's terrified response to the house (522). This piece, entitled 
"Ribbons" is, of course, entirely fictional. 
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character, or the continuous problems of identity and purpose themselves" (217). In order 
to break from the arborescent reading that privileges interiority, one must learn "[to] read 
rhizomatically: to prevent the settling of the beginning and the end one must "proceed 
from the middle," follow "lines of flight," "overthrow ontology," "establish a logic of the 
AND." If we are to follow Deleuze and Guattari's advice, it is necessary to produce the 
multiple, the nonidentical, and not just to "discover" it. That is, it is necessary for reading 
to become fiction" (217-18). 
Not unlike Auster's New York Trilogy, the book House oj Leaves is both "an 
assemblage of multiple components", and "a part within other assemblages"; a book that 
cannot be conceived as a container and "reduced to the form of identity" because it is 
"full of holes through which connections can be made to others" (214). This is slyly 
suggested by the book's playful index, which includes a large number of words belonging 
to grammatical categories that are not normally indexed, for instance the prepositions 
"inside" (680-681), "outside" (690) and the common noun "death" (672). In the Critique 
interview, Danielewski observes that his unusual index "allows you to suddenly start 
asking questions about books you normally wouldn't think about in these terms. 
Wouldn't it be nice to have an easy way to find out how many ands appear in a Faulkner 
book or the King James? Or how many Jors appear in a Virginia Woolf novel? Do they 
vary? What do these signs of reoccurrence reveal? Maybe nothing at all, but it brings that 
question to mind. And any feature of a book that invites readers to ask different sorts of 
questions is valuable" ("Haunted House" 119). More than simply an elaborate 
postmodern joke aimed at deconstructing the understood conventions of indexical 
structure, then, Danielewski's index serves to highlight and represent statistically a 
number of (teasingly?) significant stylistic habits; the reader is invited to ponder the re-
occurrence of certain words, why some words are indexed and not others, and to examine 
the different contexts within which the given words appear. Hence the fact that the 
conjunction "and" (665) is indexed and shown to permeate nearly the entire text (as it 
might reasonably be expected to) can hardly be considered insignificant; it seems to 
suggest that, like Deleuze and Guattari's rhizome, the fabric of House oj Leaves is the 
conjunction "and ... and ... and ... ", a conjunction which uproots the verb 'to be'. What 
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is more, words such as "denounce", "donkey", and "snowball" that apparently did not 
feature in the text at all, are listed as "DNE", which can stand alternatively for "Does Not 
Exist" or (perhaps more appropriately with respect to Navidson's house) "Do Not Enter". 
These entries play out (paradoxical) inversions of inside/outside and presence/absence: 
by inscribing in the index their absence from the 'main' body of the text they 
paradoxically become a presence within the book. Furthermore, if these words indeed 'do 
not exist' within the covers of the book they must therefore point to some reality outside 
of it, perhaps given its brazenly intertextual status the content of other books. As a 
system of reference then, the index, and by extension House of Leaves itself, charts our 
navigation of, and the relations between, bound embodiments of language, and as such 
problematizes the notion of the book as a self-enclosed system of meaning. 
Constituted thus as a multiplicity, the title House of Leaves refers simultaneously to 
three nonidentical editions, none of which can be privileged over any other as the 
"original" or more "authentic" edition. First published in 2000 by Pantheon Press, House 
of Leaves appeared simultaneously in two different editions: the "blue" edition, in which 
the word "house" appears in blue type throughoue, and the "red" edition, in which the 
word "minotaur" and all struck passages appear in red type. Later a "black and white" 
edition appeared, and although this does not include color the word "house" is printed in 
a lighter font than the rest of the text, lending it a gray appearance. As such, House of 
Leaves is designed to resist the ideology of traditional textual criticism, the methodology 
of which attempts to reconstruct from different editions and versions a single, and 
definitive copy text that best expresses the author's final intention. Hayles explains: 
The desire to suppress unruliness and multiplicity in search of an ideal "work" is 
deeply embedded in textual criticism. However the criteria facilitating this 
convergence are defined, textual editors have largely agreed that convergence is 
the ideal ... Not arriving at a single authoritative text, editors argue, risks 
7 This blue script, so suggestive of an Internet hyperlink, reinforces the significance of the reading 
I am proposing here, since like a rhizomatic reading, navigating the Internet is a fluid form of 
reading which effectively nullifies beginnings and endings. For a consideration of the similarities 
stranding the reader with a rat's nest of complexly interrelated variants, thus 
foisting onto her the Sisyphean labor of sorting through the mess and arriving at 
a sensible reading text that most readers would prefer to have handed to them. 
Readers in this view want a text they can take more or less at face value so they 
can get on with the work of interpreting its meaning and explicating its artistic 
strategies. Here the comparison of editing with translation is especially apt, for 
the editor, like the translator, makes innumerable decisions that can never be 
fully covered by an explicit statement of principles. As McGann points out, these 
decisions inevitably function as interpretations, for they literally construct the 
text in ways that foreground some interpretive possibilities and suppress others 
("Translating Media" 268, emphasis added). 
40 
In editing Zampano's manuscript Johnny faces the difficult task of integrating the old 
man's divergent drafts and notes into a single unified text, the difficulty of this task 
compounded by the fact that Zampano's unruly assemblage of texts are inscribed on 
everything from "old napkins", to the "tattered edges of an envelope" and the "back of a 
postage stamp." (xvii) Zampano's text, like its topic, is "uneasily contained" (3). Thus the 
reader/interpreter of House of Leaves is placed in a similar position to that of Johnny in 
his role as editor/translator of Zampano's manuscript, since Danielewski's book is itself 
an inherently divergent work, a "distributed phenomena that becomes stronger, not 
weaker, because it refuses to converge at a single site or into a single set of words" 
(Jessica Pressman, "Technotextuality" no pagination). 
The differences between the three editions are more than mere embellishments, 
superfluous frills that could be added or subtracted without compromising the book's 
integrity and 'wholeness'. As Martin Brick has demonstrated, Danielewski's use of color 
plays a crucial role in each edition's signifying practices. Thus it may be tempting to 
suppose, for example, that the absence of blue rubric script from the other two editions 
means that they are 'deficient' in significant semantic content demonstrably present in the 
between hypertextualliterature, the World Wide Web, and Deleuze and Guattari's theorization of 
the rhizome, see George P. Landow Hypertext 2.0,38-42. 
41 
blue edition. The problem with such a reading, however, lies precisely in its privileging 
of the blue edition as a kind of copy text, a move that facilitates a reading of the other two 
editions as divergent from its ideal, and therefore to some extent less "authentic" texts. 
Yet the red edition can also be positioned as the copy text and the other two as 
"secondary" or "subordinate" texts insofar as its red rubric print inscribes meanings 
unique to that edition. And the same holds true for the black and white edition. Despite its 
lack of color - indeed because of it it constitutes a significantly different, and perhaps 
more "traditional", book than either of the two color editions. If situated as the primary 
text this edition may promote, for instance, a reading in the effects of the importation of 
color into a "traditional" print novel, as if the presence of color in the red and blue 
versions were a secondary, somewhat frivolous, addition as opposed to a integral 
component of the novel's textual constitution. Nevertheless, none of the three editions 
can or should be privileged over any other as a more "authentic" or more fully 
realized version of some supposedly singular book entitled House of Leaves. What we 
have is quite literally three nonidentical "texts" all sharing the same title8. "The 
nonidentity of fiction," Briggs observes, "does not mark a doubling or multiplication of 
identity, or a divergence from it, but is rather a multiplicity of nonidentity ... a 
multiplicity without (any) identity" (215-216). The situation is complicated further, 
however, since prior to its print publication Danielewski posted portions of his book on 
the Internet in PDF format9 • This gives us four nonidentical versions. Thus like 
Navidson's house (itself a metaphor for the possible space of the text), the cluster of texts 
that constitute House of Leaves has no 'center' or copy text that would serve to ground 
the play of nonidentical editions. The idea that House of Leaves is a singular 'book' 
possessing an intrinsic unity is manifestly a fiction, so to speak. 
8 These techniques suggest that Milorad Pavic's Dictionary o/the Khazars: a Lexicon Novel in 
100,000 words (1988) may have influenced Danielewski. Like House o/Leaves, Pavic's novel 
rethinks the possibilities of the contemporary print book by forsaking traditional linear form in 
favour of an elaborately patterned dictionary format that allows for multiple, non-hierarchical 
entry and exit points and divergent reading paths. The novel is divided into three sections that are 
color-coded red, yellow and green to represent the Christian, Islamic and Jewish parts of the 
dictionary respectively. Pavic's novel is also available in two nonidentical "male" and "female" 
editions, which differ by some seventeen crucial lines. 
9 For an insightful discussion ofthe implications of Danielewski using PDF as opposed to HTML 
files for the presentation of his novel online, see Martin Brick's "Blueprint(s)". 
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The copyright material in House of Leaves further reinforces the idea of the book as a 
multiplicity of nonidentity. A ''Note'' on the copyright page of each print version lists the 
various editions and the divergences between them, and a black box surrounds the edition 
on the list the reader holds in their hand (see Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: "A Note On This Edition" from the Black & White edition of House of Leaves 
Although few readers will pause to read this note before passing directly to the main 
text, it is not insignificant, since the "full color" edition (an edition including both blue 
and red coloration) and the "incomplete" edition are in fact apocryphal, like the Navidson 
Record documentary whose existence Johnny attempts to verify. In positioning this 
spurious note here, Danielewski subverts the traditionally understood conventions of the 
copyright page, mobilizing it as part of his book's signifying practices. The copyright 
page is part of what Genette would term the work's paratext, the particular set of 
inscriptions - such as dedications, epigraphs, and prefaces - surrounding or 
supplementing a text without being part of the 'work as such'. For Genette, 
The paratext is what enables a text to become a book and to be offered as such to 
its readers and, more generally, to the public. More than a boundary or a sealed 
border, the paratext is, rather, a threshold, or a word Borges used apropos of a 
preface - a "vestibule" that offers the world at large the possibility of either 
stepping inside or turning back. It is an "undefined zone" between the inside and 
the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary on either the inward side 
(turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the world's discourse 
about the text), an edge [ ... ] (Para texts: Thresholds of Interpretation 1-2). 
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As an inscription of 'real-world' publication facts, the front matter occupies the 
paratext's outermost side, part of the world's discourse aimed at monitoring, regulating, 
and containing the text. The function of the copyright page is to close the text, with text 
understood here, following Peter Berger and Thomas Luckman, as "finite provinces of 
meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribed meanings and 
modes of experience" (cited in Packman, 43). But the presence of a fictional note here 
subverts its function as a border between text and nontext and contaminates the integrity 
of its factual information. Moreover, in blue editions of the novel, the publishing 
company "Random House" is inscribed on the copyright page in the same blue print used 
to highlight the word "house" throughout the "main" body of the text. Danielewski's 
house then, like the fictional world of Tl6n in Borges's story, seems to be insidiously 
absorbing the real world into itself, thereby destabilizing the ontological distinction 
between the text as a "finite province of meaning" and the "paramount reality." By 
printing this fictional note on the copyright page, Danielewski further underscores the 
fact that writing cannot be contained within the bounds of the print book. 
And there's more. A few months after the release of House of Leaves Pantheon 
published separately an expanded version of the correspondence Pelafina Lievre wrote to 
her son Johnny (Appendix II-E of the novel) as The Whalestoe Letters (2000). This 
supplemental work (Danielewski refers to it as a novella) introduces a new framing-
character in one Walden D. Wyhrta, while the eleven additional letters themselves 
provide a more complex story of Pelafina's slide into insanity than does the fairly linear 
account of the novel. Thus, The Whalestoe Letters forms part of, and yet remains 
nonidentical with, House of Leaves. Danielewski's textual assemblage also includes 
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works in different media. As noted above, there is considerable evidence to suggest that 
Danielewski lifted the character of Zampano from Fellini's La Strada, and that his novel, 
set after the events of this film, recounts the fictional future of this imaginary character. 
Fellini's film therefore fonns a part of the cluster of texts that constitute House of Leaves 
as it supplies significant background infonnation on this character not found within the 
novel itself. (Reading La Strada through the lens of House of Leaves, moreover, 
significantly alters our perception of the film, inflecting its plot with a greater sense of 
inevitability and doom while painting Fellini's Zampano as a much more sympathetic 
character). 
And still more connections can be made. American editions of House of Leaves, for 
instance, feature a blown-in card advertising Haunted (2000), a concept album by the 
author's sister Annie Danielewski, better known as the singer-songwriter Poe. Poe 
designed Haunted as a musical companion piece to her brother's novel and thematically 
the two works are intimately connected. The album's liner notes include a footnote that 
correlates each of its seventeen tracks to specific pages from the book, while the lyrics 
themselves reference many of its characters and events, with songs such as 'Exploration 
B', '5 & ~ Minute Hallway', and 'Dear Johnny' providing direct musical commentary on 
the novel lO• According to Danielewski, the two works evolved out of a process of 
10 The liner notes also recount how, a few years after the death of their father Tad Danielewski, 
Mark and Poe discovered a small cardboard box containing a collection of cassette recordings of 
his voice, an eclectic mix of academic lectures, casual observations on family life, and audio 
letters to his children. By including extensive digital samples from these tapes, Poe structures her 
album as a sustained "conversation" with the "ghost" of her late father, creating a spooky musical 
drama wherein she both quarrels with, and seeks intimacy from, this disembodied voice ("Poe: 
Biography"). Explicitly drawing a connection between her father's tapes and the manuscript 
Johnny inherits from Zampano, Poe states in an online interview that: "[b]oth the album and the 
book document the process of interacting with the dead ... or the unreachable, through the things, 
the splinters, they have left behind" ("Poe: Biography"). Music critic David Toop has coined the 
term "dead zone duets" to denote works of this kind. Through a process he calls "electronic 
exhumation" the performer or composer is positioned "as a satellite dish (our metaphorical 
equivalent of the spirit medium) in the wired world." (Ocean of Sound 92, 101) For Toop, "The 
beauty of exploitation overdubs or dead zone duets is their realisation of the potential of studio 
magic as science fiction, the configurations which our imaginations whisper but our bodies so 
rarely concede. A great advantage of working with dead people is that their objections, the 
objections of habit or fixed identity, go unheard. In 1988, James Brown sang in that scorched 
earth scream of his, "I'm real", but editing equipment and tape speed controls had already 
(decades ago, in fact) thrown that desperate, insecure claim into doubt" (106). 
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collaborative exchange, his novel's characters and themes influencing Poe, whose 
songwriting and music would in turn inspire him and feed back into House of Leaves 11. It 
is clear then that both conceive of their individual projects as part of a larger work what 
I am arguing here constitutes a textual assemblage that is, "a cluster of related texts that 
quote, comment upon, amplify, and remediate12 one another" (Hayles, "Translating 
Media" 278). The two works endlessly reflect one another; endlessly circulate intensities. 
For example, Poe's technique of chopping, processing and layering vocal samples to 
create densely textured sound-worlds remediates (or, if you will, remixes) Danielewski's 
metatextual use of collage, quotation and "cut-up" techniques. Poe also remediates 
Danielewski's extensive use of literary echoes into literal acoustic echoes, creating eerie 
sound hallucinations that hint at the possible madness and schizophrenia of the novel's 
narrator(s). 
The work as assemblage thus requires a radical new conception of authorship. As 
Hayles explains, the notion of the literary work as a clearly bounded totality possessed of 
an intrinsic identity "has been deeply influenced by the unitary view of the subject, 
particularly in the decades when editors sought to arrive at the work by determining an 
author's 'final intentions'" (279). (As we shall see in the next chapter, this mutually 
reinforcing relation between the bounded work and the unitary, authoritative subject is 
exploited by Nabokov as a means by which to exert control over his novel and limit the 
possible lines of interpretation). Conversely, "[t]he subjectivity implied by the [Work as 
Assemblage] cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered unified. Rather, the 
11 Poe has stated that she and Mark have ..... always riffed off (or shall I say ripped off) each 
other's ideas as writers ... [House of Leaves and Haunted] converse with each other in very much 
the same way my brother and I have conversed for years. They converse about the death of a 
father or a father figure; they converse about the terrors that riddled and finally destroyed our 
parents' marriage and our home; and they converse about the dangerous journey toward making 
amends with the voices and events that haunt us both" ("Poe: Biography"). 
12 Remediation, a term coined by media theorists Richard Grusin and Jay Bolter, signifies the 
process by which material presented in one media is transposed and mediated into the specific 
terms of another. This cycling through media is occurring all around us, a process developed and 
accelerated by the emergence of new digital technologies of reproduction. Advances in computer 
graphics, for instance, have allowed video games to resemble movies, at the same time as 
digitally animated film resemble games; websites simulate the look of traditional print books, and 
print books use unusual textual layout to mimic that of web design. See Grusin and Bolter, 
Remediation: Understanding New Media, and Hayles, Writing Machines. 
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subjects producing it are multiple in many senses, both because they are collectives in 
and among themselves, and also because they include non-human as well as human 
actors" (279-80). The assemblage of texts that constitute House of Leaves, then, involves 
multiple authors (Danielewski, Poe, even Fe1lini), as well as the various non-human 
technologies of inscription that help bring it into being. This would include, for instance, 
the digital recording technology Pro Tools, and, a propos the edition of House of Leaves 
posted on the internet, the software programs that produced, processed and displayed the 
text. 
In following the imperatives of Deleuze and Guattari, one must "proceed from the 
middle," "follow lines of flight," produce multiple connections in order to "nullify 
endings and beginnings." As the aim of this reading strategy is to produce the multiple, 
not discover it, interpretation must become fiction. The critic should strive, in the words 
of Oscar Wilde, ''to see the object as in itself it really is not.,,13 To suggest, therefore, that 
this rhizomatic reading is exhaustive and final rather than provisional and partial (in 
every sense of that word) would be to betray its very purpose, and the status of the book 
as textual assemblage. Like Navidson's endlessly shifting labyrinth, which grows and 
shrinks in response to an individual's mental state, Danielewski's House of Leaves grows 
and shrinks according to the singular desires of the reader that quite literally construct 
(or, perhaps more accurately, build) the text in ways that foregrounds some elements of 
the assemblage while suppressing others. Thus, as George Landow observes, the work as 
textual assemblage is oriented "directly to performance, to interaction" (Hypertext 2.0 
41). Then again, an arborescent reading of House of Leaves as a unified work containing 
themes and intentions traceable to an identifiable author would appear to be as equally 
fictitious as a rhizomatic reading that would seek to construct it as a multiplicity of 
nonidentity without an identifiable beginning and ending. 
The work as textual assemblage provides an alternative to the closure of the traditional 
print noveL With House of Leaves, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to 
13 Cited in the preface to Doom Patrols, an online book that author Steven Shaviro describes as a 
"theoretical fiction about postmodemism." 
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determine where the text physically "ends." So unlike, say, the detective novel, there is 
no final page the reader can flip to to find the solution to the mystery. House of Leaves's 
status as an assemblage of distributed texts, as well as the non-teleological reading paths 
available to the reader within "the novel per se," allows for forms of reading that escape 
the death-drive of closure and the linearity of an unfolding plotline. Since, as Hansen has 
observed, House of Leaves "always yield[s] one more singular experience each time it is 
read" (606), Danielewski's novel foregrounds the limitations of closure while 
simultaneously eliciting "new forms of pleasure, pleasure not from the inevitability of an 
ending, but from the multiplicity of openings" ("The Electronic Labyrinth: Closure" no 
pagination). 
How, then, can I 'end' my rhizomatic reading of Danielewski's book other than by 
acknowledging that it too must ultimately amount to a fiction, an engineered projection 
that reflects - however obliquely - the particular desires and fears of the interpreter? As 
we have seen, Danielewski encourages the reader to consider his book as a site of 
personal projection. So perhaps it is not so surprising that my critical reading should wind 
up being to a certain extent fictional (even obliquely autobiographical?), since as 
Zampano remarks: "[i]t would seem the language of objectivity can never adequately 
address the reality of place on Ash Tree lane" (378-79), or the book that house represents. 
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Chapter 2: Authorial Tyranny in Vladimir Nabokov's Pale Fire 
"[N]ovels of the sixties serve as powerful critical fables for critics of the seventies, and 
eighties, and beyond, fables about conventions of criticism both old and new. Especially 
of interest [is] the relationship between creative writer and critic, sometimes articulated 
forcefully as a rivalry in the last decade." 
- Marianna Torgovnick' 
Nabokov's authorial tyranny remains a central problem in much recent Pale Fire 
criticism. Simply put, how can one provide new and innovative interpretations of a 
text that, in the words of 1. P Shute, "declares itself invulnerable to other discourses 
that might wish to invade it, to infiltrate it, to filch its quiddity"? ("Nabokov and 
Freud" 641). The obstinate and somewhat mysterious influence Nabokov continues to 
exert over his critics has resulted in a great deal of insular criticism wherein the 
interpreter remains forever locked within the text, endlessly tracing correlations 
between poem and commentary in an effort to unearth some ever-elusive meaning 
Nabokov is believed to have secreted deep within its inky depths. Partly because of 
this, and partly because of what Jill LeRoy-Frazier calls a "fundamental anxiety" 
about and resistance to, post-structuralist theories of language and meaning (a subject 
to which we will return), Nabokovian criticism remains to this day squarely author-
centered ("Playing a Game of Worlds" 312-13). 
In his essay "Pale Fire: The near-tyranny of the author" (1999), Maurice Couturier 
confronts the problem of Nabokov's "tyranny" head on, persuasively arguing that the 
power struggle between the creative writer and critic forms not only the subject but 
also the central structuring principle of Pale Fire. If modem novels such as Joyce's 
Ulysses are "largely open structurally" and encourage a creative response from the 
reader, Couturier argues, Nabokov's text remains "hermetically locked" and "durably 
reader-resistant" (54). He rightly characterizes Pale Fire as "a highly daunting text 
which forces the reader to enter its black box and compels him to try and recompose 
or refigure it in an attempt to free himself from it" (61). Couturier's choice of 
metaphor is significant here. The term "black box" commonly denotes an enigmatic 
apparatus or contraption with unknown or unspecified components. Forced to enter 
, Marianna Torgovnick, "Nabokov and his Successors" 24. 
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this inscrutable black box - the tight fuselage-world of the Nabokovian text - the 
reader/interpreter must struggle valiantly to escape it. Couturier's description of Pale 
Fire as a hennetically sealed "black box" thus stands in contradistinction to 
Danielewski's novel and its synecdochal "blue box" which serves, as we have seen, as 
a site of projection for the reader, a scene of their involvement in the text. Whereas 
Danielewski's blue box points up the novel's status as open-work and foregrounds the 
reader's participation in the text and the process of meaning making, Couturier's 
black box metaphor accurately reflects the cryptic nature of Pale Fire and Nabokov's 
assertion of absolute authority over the text and its meaning. In a similar vein, John 
Updike claims that Nabokov, like Beckett and Borges, "makes fine airtight boxes, like 
five-foot plastic cubes in a Minimal Art show, all inner-reflection and shimmer, 
perfectly self-contained, detached from even the language of their composition" (cited 
in David Packman, Vladimir Nabokov: the Structure of Literary Desire 95). Updike 
criticizes these writers because their works do not make sufficient contact with 
"reality". "The boxes" he states, "must have holes where reality can look out and 
readers can look in" (95). Without this reciprocating channel to "reality", such texts 
inevitably remain closed and resistant to readerly interpretation. 
In this reading then, Nabokov wants to claim total control of his text and its 
meaning. Hence, he quite explicitly constructs his novel as an infernal "black box" or 
prison-labyrinth in an attempt to ensnare and confuse critics who would otherwise 
assert mastery over his text and appropriate it to a totalitarian henneneutic grid that 
for Nabokov would destroy its delicate, multicolored tissue. In one of the novel's 
more self-referential passages, Nabokov makes explicit this connection between text 
and labyrinth: 
Aristotle! Ah, there would be a man to talk with! What satisfaction to see 
him take, like reins from between his fingers, the long ribbon of man's life and 
trace it through the mystifying maze of all the wonderful adventure .... The 
crooked made straight. The Daedalian plan simplified by a look from above -
smeared out as it were by the splotch of master thumb that made the whole 
involuted, boggling thing one beautiful straight line (205-06). 
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And it is, of course, Nabokov who claims to occupy this unassailable position of 
authority from "above", who claims to have or be the god-like "master thumb" 
capable of straightening out Pale Fire, smoothing its numerous textual knots and 
enigmas into "one beautiful straight line." Richard Rorty, (unconsciously?) invoking 
the reversible figure of the labyrinth, cogently sums up the situation thus: 
The reason it is going to be relatively hard to turn [Pale Fire] into a classic is 
that we guardians of legitimacy, we servants of reality, can only make sound 
observations about a novel, find admirable illustrations of general truths in it, 
if we can get it under controL We need to stand at a distance from it in order 
to see it steadily and whole. But Nabokov arranges things so that, just when 
we thought that we had stepped back and found the proper standpoint from 
which to see his book in perspective, we get an uncanny sense that the book is 
looking at us from a considerable distance, and chuckling. ("Introduction" x, 
emphasis added) 
In other words, Nabokov, a Daedalian artificer par excellence, has designed an 
intricate, labyrinthine text that induces confusion and disorientation for those trapped 
within; only when it is transcended and seen from above and in its entirety can its 
apparent chaos be converted to dazzling artistry and its pattern and meaning 
discerned. Yet few critics claim to have successfully navigated its convoluted 
pathways and gained, as it were, a privileged and stable viewpoint from above that 
would make sense of the pattern and meaning of the whole. Rather, as David 
Rampton observes, "Nabokov's marvelous labyrinth" has proven to be a successful 
trap for many unwary critics who, lost in its textual maze, "blunder along 
passageways which often turn out to be dead-ends" (Vladimir Nabokov: a Critical 
Study of the Novels 160). More specifically, Nabokov's teasing suggestion that Pale 
Fire has a single, dominant voice is the most elaborate way he has asserted control 
over the interpretation of his text, and imprisoned his critics within the novel's black 
box. To see exactly how this is done, a brief summary of Pale Fire is in order. 
The novel consists of John Shade's autobiographical poem "Pale Fire", and a 
highly idiosyncratic foreword, commentary, and index purportedly authored by 
Charles Kinbote, Shade's neighbor and colleague at Wordsmith College, New Wye. 
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Kinbote's apparatus criticus is not the scholarly work it professes to be, however. 
Rather, like Johnny's commentary on 'The Navidson Record', it too is an 
autobiographical text that bears, initially at least, little resemblance to its ostensible 
object of study. Kinbote, we discover, may in fact be Charles Xavier, the exiled king 
of a northern European land known as Zembla. In his commentary, then, Kinbote 
willfully misreads 'Pale Fire' so that Shade's autobiographical poem appears really to 
be a veiled account of his own remembered life as King Charles. On a first reading, 
then, Shade's poem and Kinbote's commentary seem to have little in common. 
Further investigation, however, reveals a large number of correspondences between 
them; despite their obvious incongruities, the two texts emerge as refracted images of 
each other. Thus the question naturally arises as to who is responsible for this 
elaborately woven network of echoes and allusions. Simply put, do Shade and 
Kinbote represent two separate voices in the novel, as creator of poem and 
commentary respectively, or is there - as the many connections teasingly suggest - a 
single, dominant voice that is creating both the novel's parts? And if so, whose voice 
is it, Shade's or Kinbote's? Formulated in one form or another, this question has 
dominated criticism of Pale Fire from Mary McCarthy's acclaimed essay "A Bolt 
from the Blue" (appearing a few months after the novel's publication) to Brian 
Boyd's recent magnum opus Nabokov's Pale Fire: the Magic of Artistic Discovery 
(1999). 
Significantly, critics are diametrically opposed on the question of sole authorship. 
On the one hand, commentators such as Julia Bader, Andrew Field, and Boyd, argue 
that Shade writes both poem and commentary; on the other, Page Stegner and D. 
Barton Johnson maintain that Kinbote is author of the whole thing2• As David 
Packman observes, "[ e ]ach of these readings involves a decision as to how the text 
may be framed. Attributing Shade's poem to Kinbote constructs one kind of frame; 
attributing Kinbote's commentary to Shade constructs another. Meaning is fixed in 
each case by the position of the frame" (Vladimir Nabokov: the Structure of Literary 
Desire 71). Nevertheless, despite their conflicting conclusions, both readings share the 
2 For the Shade an interpretation see Julia Bader, Crystal Land: Artifice in Nabokov's Novels; 
Andrew Field, Nabokov: His Life in Art; andBrian Boyd, Vladimir Nabokov: The American 
Years. For the Kinbotean argument see Page Stegner, Escape into Aesthetics: The Art of 
Vladimir Nabokov; and D. Barton Johnson, "The Index of Refraction in Nabokov's Pale 
Fire." 
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same fundamental interpretative methodology, a methodology that has delimited and 
'fixed' the horizon of interpretive possibilities within which Pale Fire is read today. 
Both readings decide to reconfigure the text as the work of a single, controlling 
presence. This central presence functions as a Foucauldian 'unity of discourse' that 
imparts a sense of unity to the novel's disparate parts and effaces their contradictions. 
In this reading, then, Pale Fire is seen as a clearly delineated totality of meaning 
where the logos in this case, a central, authoritative presence circumscribes and 
controls the play of textual inscription. 
In the struggle to make Nabokov's unorthodox novel "conform to the standards of 
an authoritative central presence and a grounding in a recognizable reality," 
commentators are therefore also "forced to choose between Shade and New Wye, or 
Kinbote and the Kingdom of Zembla, as the norm from which the other represents a 
fictional deviation" (LeRoy-Frazier, "Playing a Game of Worlds" 311-12). For 
example, Shadean interpretations are content to read Kinbote's commentary as merely 
"an inflated, referentless fable," privileging Shade as the dominant voice and thus 
New Wye as the novel's primary 'reality' (Couturier, "The near-tyranny of the 
author" 63). If Pale Fire is read along realist lines, then reductive interpretations are 
inevitable, since from the perspective of traditional realism Shade's earthly, 'realistic' 
New Wye and Kinbote's fabulous romance kingdom of Zembla cannot both be 
afforded the same 'truth' status within the novel's fictional universe. In these terms, 
the two worlds are simply incommensurable. 
If, as Boccaccio said, "labyrinthine art begets a hermeneutic labyrinth" (cited in 
Doob, 215), then the sheer volume of criticism on the problem of authorship in Pale 
Fire surely constitutes such a hermeneutic labyrinth. Moreover, this critical history 
exhibits one of the characteristic features of the labyrinth as Penelope Reed Doob sees 
it that is, the quality of reversible judgment. Just as our perception of labyrinths is 
intrinsically unstable - change your perspective and the labyrinth appears to change -
'definitive' critical interpretations of Nabokov's labyrinthine novel have proven 
similarly unstable and reversible. For example Boyd, once "the staunchest proponent" 
of the Shadean reading, has recently renounced his adherence to this interpretation 
(The Magic of Artistic Discovery, 4). In his radical new reading, Shade and Kinbote 
emerge again as two separate voices; nevertheless, Shade remains the dominant voice 
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of the novel since, so Boyd contends, he controls and guides the composition of 
Kinbote's text through a ghostly possession of his commentator. Even in this 
"radical" new reading, then, Pale Fire's elusive 'meaning' is still understood to hinge 
on uncovering and identifying the voice that dominates the book. Again, this critical 
imperative arises from the subtle ways in which the poem and commentary echo and 
mirror each other, thus hinting at some ultimate design behind them. As Alvin Kernan 
succinctly puts it, "everything in the 'plexed artistry' of the novel seems to lead on to 
everything else and to tease us with the possibility of a completely articulated 
structure which, if understood, will allow us to fly through the barrier ofthe text into a 
meaning beyond" (cited in Boyd, 115, emphasis added). 
But more than forty years after the novel's publication the controversial debate over 
who invented whom, and the concomitant question of whether Shade's New Wye or 
Kinbote's Zembla is the novel's primary 'reality', remain unresolved. One thing, at 
least, is clear: the special density of the Nabokovian text is such that it can 
accommodate both interpretations. Therefore this thorny issue, together with the 
novel's multilingual puns, anagrammatic signatures, riddles, and word-games, all 
encourage the reader to question the author and his intentions; they continually point 
beyond the different authorial masks to Nabokov the man and his final authority as 
the designer of both the novel's parts. The decision to read Pale Fire in quest of a 
controlling voice reinforces the view of Nabokov evident in much of the criticism. 
That is to say, the idea of Nabokov the masterful stylist always exerting full control 
over every element of his texts, and the idea that Pale Fire has a controlling, 
authoritative voice that it is the job of criticism to uncover, mutually reinforce and 
determine each other. And this, of course, is just what Nabokov wants. As Couturier 
says, Nabokov "claims emphatically that the reader will never be able to crack all the 
novel's secrets without his help, that he is or has the final key that can open all the 
doors" (71). Thus, the question of authorship emerges, finally, as the most elaborate 
way Nabokov strives to assert control over his text and programme our responses to 
it. What is more, critics for the most part have been reluctant to read the novel 
innovatively for fear of reproducing Kinbote's unscholarly manoeuvres, thus choosing 
instead the more conventional approach of reading in quest of the author's 
'intentions'. Consequently, as Rampton observes, in Pale Fire criticism "there has 
been no momentous 'death of the author' and no consequent 'freedom for the critic" 
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(164). As a result, many ofNabokov's exegetes remain forever imprisoned within the 
novel's black box, endlessly annotating the text from within (rather than actively 
interpreting it), seeking to refigure the disparate parts as the product of a single, 
authoritative presence, that elusive final signified or "devilish key" that would "open 
all the doors" (Couturier, "The near-tyranny of the author" 54, 71). 
The exhaustive debate over whether Shade or Kinbote is the controlling author of 
the text arises from the fact that critics persist in reading Pale Fire from the normative 
standards of classic realism; that is, it is precisely this critical position that generates 
the problem itself. Nabokov of course invites such readings since they ultimately 
point back to his final authority as 'author'; indeed, he programs them into the 
structure of Pale Fire to control the way in which his text is read. However, 
Nabokov's concept of 'reality' as an artificial construct in fact compromises the 
validity of such traditional realist-oriented accounts and thus by extension actually 
weakens his claims to hermeneutic control. In other words, the implications of 
Nabokov's rejection of consensual reality open up possibilities for new readings that 
free us from Nabokov's tyranny and allow us to escape the black box of the text. 
For Nabokov as for Danielewski, all texts enter into a dialogue with the literary 
past. As such, Pale Fire cannot be conceptualized as a hermetically sealed black box 
precisely because it is full of gaps through which connections can be made to other 
texts. Therefore, in what follows I approach Pale Fire not as a rigidly organized and 
coherent totality producing one dominant reading but as an assemblage of textual 
fragments capable of generating any number of effects. "The components of an 
assemblage," as Packman observes, "need to be read in relation to each other, not in 
isolation" (78). Thus unlike Updike and many of Nabokov's exegetes I consider Pale 
Fire "not as a reified aesthetic object", an impenetrable black box, but rather as a "site 
of potential encounters" (Packman, Vladimir Nabokov: The Structure of Literary 
Desire 2). Reading Pale Fire alongside House of Leaves, then, I adopt an interpretive 
strategy that allows the two novels to speak to each other, in the hope of stimulating 
new and innovative interpretations. Danielewski's novel - an iteration of Nabokov's 
pioneering metafictional form for our post-structuralist, post-modem world - can help 
bring into focus the points of instability latent in the unique structure of Nabokov's 
novel, and by extension the blind-spots of previous Nabokovian criticism. That is to 
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say, House of Leaves retrospectively allows us to see, in the interpretive restrictions 
Pale Fire erects, the possibility for new, disobedient readings that examine what 
Nabokov sought to suppress, and why. Following Deleuze and Guattari then, I ask, 
"in connection with what other things" Nabokov's novel "does or does not transmit 
intensities, in which other multiplicities its own are inserted and metamorphosed" (A 
Thousand Plateaus 4). 
Reality and Postmodern Time 
How can I put it? Life is like video footage -
Hard to edit, directors, they never understood it 
- The Wu-Tang Clan, 'Reunited' 
Jill LeRoy-Frazier is the only critic to have adequately addressed Nabokov's 
rejection of the concept of an 'absolute reality', and the implications of this rejection 
for the received critical views of Pale Fire. As she rightly observes, the critical 
impulse to uncover a controlling voice in the novel and a grounding in an identifiable 
'reality' "arises from a set of faulty critical assumptions based upon Nabokov's own 
conception of art's purpose and function that entail a negation of at least some ofthe 
possible implications of his views" (312). This negation involves a curious critical 
resistance to post-structuralist ideas concerning the instability of language, 
specifically its inability to convey us beyond the realm of the signifier. Thus Shadean 
and Kinbotean readings, founded as they are in a recognizable reality, 
ignore the possibility that Pale Fire might be questioning the very constitution 
of the "reality" upon which such a paradigm rests. Elsewhere, Nabokov has 
declared that there is no such thing as recognizable or everyday reality in 
which to be grounded in the first place. Rather, reality is a "very SUbjective 
affair," a "gradual accumulation of information" that the individual mind must 
process and synthesize in order to create his or her own version of the world. 
The notion of an everyday reality is faulty because it "presupposes a situation 
that is permanently observable, essentially objective, and universally known"; 
in Nabokov's conception, one must make creative and associative links 
between pieces of information in order to compile a picture of the world. The 
individual formulation of one's reality will never correspond directly to 
anyone else's; hence the belief in the existence of a common ground of 
experience to which everyone can refer is itself a fiction (312). 
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Therefore Nabokov's rejection of an everyday reality means that "in a universe in 
which there is no standard or norm to deviate from in the first place, it is impossible, 
and unnecessary, to prove that New Wye is any more real than Zembla," or 
conversely, that Zembla is more real (or no less real) than New Wye (313). The two 
worlds are equally real or, as it were, equally fictional. 
In House of Leaves, of course, the absence of a grounding reality is more explicitly 
legible. Reading Pale Fire through the lens of Danielewski's novel can therefore 
provide a more accurate picture of the text than those readings that attempt to posit 
within the novel a primary 'reality' behind the play of textual representation. 
Analogous to the structure of Pale Fire, what we are presented with in House of 
Leaves is a palimpsest of densely overlaid writings and readings. There is the 
Navidson documentary constructed from film, video, and audio tape; Zampano's 
commentary on the film; Johnny's (re)construction of Zampano's text and the 
idiosyncratic footnotes he appends to the text; and finally the anonymous 'Editors' 
supply the further supplemental material found in the exhibits, appendix, and index. 
The realist novel presents itself as a transparent window of language that 
unproblematically gives out on to a mimetically faithful representation of 'reality.' 
Conversely, what we have in House of Leaves is a chain of opaque inscriptions, an 
interminable redoubling of text upon text. Moreover, the Navidson film, which 
ostensibly sets in motion this chain of supplementary glosses, does not in fact exist; 
hence there is an absence of any real-world referent that would serve to ground and 
control the play of supplementary inscription. But as Hayles points out, this does not 
simply result in absence: rather 'reality' is "evacuated as [ an] originary [object] of 
representation" only to be "reconstituted through multiple layers of remediation" 
("Saving the Subject" 782-83). The 'reality' or referent in House of Leaves is 
established as a concept only, one that emerges not behind but through the multiple 
inscriptions of the various narrators. 
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A similar dynamic operates in Nabokov's novel. Shade, for example, perceives and 
transforms the various impressions he receives from his surroundings, transmuting 
them into the tightly ordered world of his poem. One of the most significant of these 
impressions is the vision of a luminous fountain he experienced during a near-death 
experience. Much of the poem relates Shade's quest to validate this striking image as 
evidence of the existence of an afterlife. He thinks he has found this evidence when 
he stumbles across a newspaper account of a woman who claims to have witnessed a 
similar fountain during her own brush with death. As Shade discovers, however, the 
woman had seen a "mountain", not a "fountain"; what he took to be confirmation of 
an afterlife thus turns out to be merely a textual misprint. Nevertheless, he recounts 
this discovery in his poem, and makes use of extensive mountain imagery, concluding 
that whatever evidence of an afterlife there may be lies not in any empirically 
verifiable evidence but rather in "topsy-turvical coincidence" (53). 
In his tum, Kinbote transmutes this imagery into the specific topography of 
Zembla: 
Northward melted the green, gray, bluish mountains Falkberg with its hood 
of snow, Mutraberg with the fan of its avalanche, Paberg (Mt. Peacock), and 
others, - separated by narrow dim valleys with intercalated cotton-wool bits of 
cloud that seemed placed between the receding sets of ridges to prevent their 
flanks from scraping against one another (116). 
These mountains, so vividly evoked here and elsewhere in the commentary, seem to 
exert a palpable sense of reality in terms at least partly consistent with traditional 
novelistic mimesis3• Yet they are only part of Kinbote' s constructed world of Zembla, 
a simulacrum that emerges through a convoluted series of textual transmissions: 
Kinbote's commentary derives its mountain imagery from a reference in Shade's 
3 Thus even critics who position Kinbote's Zembla as a fictional deviation from the grounding 
reality of Shade's New Wye still insist on the former's evocative power, its ability to produce 
convincing "reality effects." Here, for instance, is Robert Alter: "[Kinbote's] tale of Zembla is 
manifestly a fiction twice removed from the reality in which the reader sits with the book in 
his hand, but in [the] vividness [of its imagery], ... in the way it manages to correspond 
through all its farcical gyrations to the ... composite image of a possible European political 
history, it has a kind of authority, and does not allow us to dismiss it as 'mere' fiction" 
(Partial Magic 193). 
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poem, a reference that Shade in tum derived from a misprint in a newspaper article 
that actually read "fountain", not "mountain." As in House of Leaves, then, there can 
be no recourse to some truth or grounding reality in Pale Fire, since both Shade's 
New Wye and Kinbote's Zembla gradually materialize only through a complex 
process of redoubled and refracted textual inscriptions4 • 
Critical readings that attempt to uncover a dominant voice in Pale Fire are also 
negated by Nabokov's rejection of a foundational reality since, as Danielewski's 
novel makes plain, this rejection inevitably entails a subversion of any hierarchy of 
textual authority. Criticism, for example, commonly assumes that the texts of Shade 
and Kinbote are "related to one other as precursor to successor, primary text to 
secondary" (LeRoy-Frazier, "Playing a Game of Worlds" 314). This assumption has 
naturally given rise to the prominent Shadean interpretation of the novel. This reading 
privileges Shade's poem as the novel's primary text, which in tum facilitates a view 
of Kinbote's commentary as an aberrant deviation. But a different relationship 
between the texts than that found in the majority of criticism emerges if we recognize 
the implications of inhabiting a world without a consensual, grounding reality. 
LeRoy-Frazier again: 
If one of the results of the absence of objective reality is the concurrent release 
from the perceived constraints of linear time, then within this context it is 
possible to claim that Shade's text does not necessarily precede Kinbote's as 
the progenitor to which Kinbote's text owes its existence. To clarify: when 
creating a version of reality, one is not necessarily required to connect events 
in linear order. This phenomenon is perhaps most easily understood when 
thought of in terms of the creation of past reality, or memory ... The mind 
applies its imaginative powers of association and synthesis to the various 
recollections that it holds, and formulates a coherent sense of the world as 
experienced. One's impressions of the past are discrete bits of information that 
the mind can combine in various ways, irrespective of the linear order in 
which they were originally perceived to have occurred. As Nabokov sees it, 
4 My analysis of Kinbote's transformation of Shade's mountain reference into the majestic 
geography of Zembla is indebted to Patrick O'Donnell's brilliant "Watermark: Writing the 
Selfin Nabokov's Pale Fire", especially pages 394-395. 
the memory "store[s] up this or that element which creative imagination may 
want to use when combining it with later recollections and inventions. In this 
sense, both memory and imagination are a negation of time" (315). 
59 
From this perspective, then, it is impossible to place Shade's and Kinbote's texts in an 
historical order, and thus futile to argue for the historical primacy of one text over the 
other. Once the constraints of linear time are removed, both texts tum out to be 
essentially contemporary with one other. "In a linguistic universe," writes LeRoy-
Frazier, "all texts are secondary, and thus all fictions are equal" (317). Moreover, it is 
also misguided and pointless trying to prove that either Shade or Kinbote is the 
dominant voice of the text since both authorial figures are, like the realities they 
fashion, equally fictional. (The equality of the two texts will be elaborated on in the 
discussion of Kinbote and supplementarity below). And these textual realities or 
'worlds' do not, of course, reflect some fundamental, underlying reality, since for 
Nabokov, according to LeRoy-Frazier, such a "reality is itself an artificial construct, a 
synthesis of ruling conventions that is precisely fictional" (312). 
Here we need to redress a common critical misapprehension concerning Nabokov's 
blurring of the distinction between fiction and reality. Robert Alter, for example, 
whose views have been often echoed in subsequent criticism, writes that the novel's 
'''principal concern" is "how each individual mind filters reality, recreates it [that is, 
fictionalizes it], and the moral quandaries generated by that problematic of 
epistemology" (Partial Magic 215). Hence for Alter there still exists an objective, 
underlying reality independent of the mind's necessarily distortive mediations. Alter 
reads the problematic blurring of fiction and reality in the novel as Nabokov's defense 
of reality and the endangered standards of engaging fully and responsibly with it. 
This reading thus involves a fundamental misrecognition of both the patent 
'unreality' of Pale Fire's textual worlds as well as Nabokov's own expressed views 
on the subject: 
To be sure, there is an average reality, perceived by all of us, but that is not 
true reality: it is only the reality of general ideas, conventional forms of 
humdrummery, current editorials, .... Paradoxically, the only real, authentic 
worlds are, of course, those that seem unusual. When my fancies will have 
been sufficiently imitated, they, too, will enter the common domain of average 
reality, which will be false, too, but within a new context which we cannot yet 
guess. Average reality begins to rot and stink as soon as the act of individual 
creation ceases to animate a subjectively perceived texture (Strong Opinions, 
118). 
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Traditionally, Nabokov's exegetes have embarked on a futile quest to uncover behind 
the novel's play of textual representation a grounding reality congruent with the 
demands of traditional realism. Yet, as we have already observed, Shade's New Wye 
and Kinbote's Zembla do not point back to some foundational reality; rather, these 
textual realities in fact emerge only through a complex superimposition of textual 
inscriptions. Thus if we are to prevent Nabokov's fantastic worlds from entering into 
the "common domain of average reality" (here, the normative standards of literary 
realism), criticism now should strive to reinvest the novel with something like its 
original "unusualness", should strive to re-animate it with a "subjectively perceived 
texture." It is the creative distortions, remediations, and deliberate misreadings made 
by artists influenced by Nabokov that point the way forward in this regard. It might be 
revealing, then, to submit Nabokov's own expressed view of reality to the same 
process of superimposition (using these creative distortions) that marks the gradual 
emergence of the two realities of his novel. In other words, rather than attempting to 
recuperate Nabokov's view of reality through the values and assumptions of 
"mimesis", values and assumptions that underpin traditional critical representation 
itself, I will mimic the compositional structure of the novel (just as Johnny mimics 
that of Zampano's novel when faced with the impossible task of "representing" the 
referential void that lies at its heart). 
A useful example for this purpose is Canadian horror auteur David Cronenberg, the 
director of such acclaimed films as The Fly, Dead Ringers, eXistenZ, and Spider. In 
interviews, Cronenberg has often spoken of the profound influence Nabokov has 
exerted on his films and this influence is readily apparent in much of his work. As 
Mark Browning observes, Cronenberg "literally 'plays' with a number ofNabokovian 
features, including ludic motifs, the use of mise-en-abime, the significance of naming, 
self-consuming narrative structures," and even "markers of authorial intrusion" in the 
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form of entomological imagery ("Thou, the Player of the Game, art God" 58, 66)5. 
Nabokov's views on 'reality-creation' are particularly pertinent to Cronenberg's 
aesthetic. For Cronenberg, filmmakers instantiate Nabokov's concept of reality-as-
simulation through their projection of flickering new-worlds upon the blue screen of 
film production. His own films, therefore, can be read as a creative embodiment of 
Nabokov's view of reality, a view scholarly criticism of Pale Fire is blinkered to by 
their insistence on reading the novel along realist lines (or in the case of Alter, reading 
in quest of some moral significance). 
In interviews, Cronenberg frequently responds to questions concerning his social 
responsibility as an artist in what he terms a "Nabokovian way" (Timothy R. Lucas, 
"David Cronenberg: A Postscript" 12). In particular, Nabokov's view of reality allows 
him to deflect negative criticism regarding his film's depictions of violence and 
'deviant' sexuality, deemed by some as potentially detrimental to social health. Thus, 
Cronenberg says: 
Nabokov always said that, after all those years spent reinventing Russia, he 
found himself faced with the prospect of having to reinvent America. What he 
meant, of course, is that an artist does not deal with 'Reality' (as it is properly 
known) but in fact has to reinvent everything. Each work is the invention of a 
world. That's why, when I say there's no such thing as a realistic film - and I 
do I'm really only echoing Nabokov, saying there is no such thing as a 
realistic novel ("David Cronenberg: A Postscript" 11-12, underlining 
removed). 
For Cronenberg as for Nabokov, 'everyday reality' is itself a fiction, an artificial 
construct: 
5 Interestingly, Timothy R. Lucas notes "that the major auteurs behind the contemporary 
horror film are influencing the genre with their personal interests in the writings of Vladimir 
Nabokov" (10-11). He quotes horror director Joe Dante (Twilight Zone: the Movie, The 
Howling) as saying: "Nabokov has almost replaced Brecht for this generation of filmmakers. 
When people went beyond the realm of film, it was called Brechtian. Today, the same thing is 
Nabokovian" (10). It is possible to suggest, then, that one of the ways in which Nabokov 
indirectly influenced Danielewski was through contemporary horror films, since these exerted 
an obvious influence on the subject matter and form of House of Leaves. See Lucas, "David 
Cronenberg: A Postscript". 
There is no absolute reality. We must, we are forced to, it is our destiny and it 
is our nature to constantly recreate reality. Sometimes, on a daily basis. [We 
must learn to talk in terms of reality-creation] rather than talking about 
burrowing down to or stripping away all falseness and coming to an 
understanding of absolute reality. There is nothing there. You have to accept 
the burden of creating your own reality (Ira Nayman, "Definitely a David 
Cronenberg Film"). 
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Cronenberg is drawn to the fact that Nabokov often relied on cinematic metaphors to 
describe the pliable nature of memory and by extension 'reality' itself. In Lolita, for 
instance, Humbert is frustrated by the ostensibly fixed sequential order writing 
imposes upon his memories, and thus yearns after film's flexibility and what he calls 
its "fantastic simultaneousness" (cited in Robert Starn, Reflexivity in Film and 
Literature 144). Specifically, Humbert wishes he had frozen Lolita's image on film, 
so that he could freeze her, possess and manipulate her in the present: "That I could 
have had all her strokes, all her enchantments, immortalized in segments of celluloid, 
makes me moan to-day with frustration" (cited in Packman, 49). And Hayles observes 
that in Ada Marina's "recollections are distanced in her mind as if she were watching 
a movie of her past - a movie she intends to edit and rearrange at her convenience" 
("Making a Virtue of Necessity" 46). The adaptable nature of memory allows Marina 
to, as it were, 'redirect' and 'edit' her past endlessly, to create any number of 'false' 
histories unrestrained by the limits of linear time6. 
Cronenberg's Spider (2002) offers itself as an allegory of this process. The film's 
protagonist is Dennis 'Spider' Cleg, an inmate of a halfWay house in 1950s London 
6 For Dabney Stuart, Laughter in the Dark is the Nabokov novel "whose structure, and 
meaning, depends most pervasively on the motion picture as a form through which the 
experience of the book is to be perceived and evaluated" (Nabokov: the Dimensions of 
Parody 89). Indeed, the filmic techniques Nabokov employs in this novel are remarkably 
similar to those used by Danielewski in House of Leaves: "The profusion of chapters, their 
varied lengths, and especially the very brief ones, suggest a scenario. There are stage 
directions not only for the last scene but also on page 150. Twice the fictional technique 
suggests the use of a subliminal frame in a motion picture ... The first three chapters make the 
past present by flashback, and the point of view from which the accident is handled (Chapter 
32) suggests the cinematic technique of panning" (94 n9). 
who is haunted by traumatic childhood memories, which he incessantly rehearses in 
an attempt to find coherence in his life. These memory sequences focus on a young 
Spider and his troubled relationship with his working-class parents. Significantly, the 
adult Spidcr is present within these scenes, observing silently from a corner or 
through a window his childhood self and parents interacting as if he were a director 
on a movic set, as Cronenberg puts it , "redirecting and rechoreof,rrarhing his 
memories" (Andrew O ' I1ehir, "The Baron of Blood docs Bergman"). As thc fj ·lm 
progresses the line between accurate recall and invention is increasingly blurred , so 
that memory and ' reality' are revealed as unstable concepts , open to endless revision 
and redescription irrespective of the linear order in which they arc perceived to have 
occurred. In this way, Cronenbcrg figures forth his Nabokovian notion of mcmory or 
past reality as '3 created thing, ' something that we are 'constantly rewriting' and 
'redirecting. ' 
I: David Cronenberg (left) directing Ralph Fieilles on the set of Spider 
Nabokov ' s view of reality and memory, thus refracted through the lens of 
Cronenberg's filmic remediations, emerges as uncannily similar to those of 
Danielewski. Like Nabokov, Danielewski observes how the malleability of memory 
allows us to ceaselessly refigure and recreate our past. As he puts it : "we live 
comfortably because we create these sacred domains in our head where we believe 
that we have a specific history, a certain set of expericnces ... [bJut memory never 
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puts us in touch with anything directly; it's always interpretive, reductive, a 
complicated compression of information" ("Haunted House" 121). Danielewski also 
uses the process of film editing as a metaphor for the way memory and desire create 
delusively neat pictures of the past by combining temporally disparate events 
according to the demands of the present. For example, after escaping from the house 
Navidson edits and re-edits his documentary footage, manipulating the representation 
of the traumatic events that took place there according to his present needs and 
desires. Thus, Zampano warns his readers on the historical veracity of the 
'completed' film: 
[NJostalgia's role in shaping the final cut [of The Navidson Record] must not 
be forgotten, especially since within a year these pieces were all Navidson had 
left Karen and the children a mere blur racing down the staircase, the 
pointillism of their pets' paw prints caught on the dew covered lawn, or the 
house itself, an indefinite shimmer, sitting quietly on the comer of Succoth and 
Ash Tree Lane, bathed in afternoon light (17-8). 
Likewise, Shade and Kinbote construct their textual realities from the temporally 
distinct events of their lives, moving freely back and forth in time for suitable 
material. This movement is on display in the opening stanzas of Shade's poem. Alfred 
Appel has described how Nabokov often "begins a narrative only to stop and retell the 
passage differently, halts a scene to 'rerun' it on the chapter's screen" (cited in 
Browning 63). Here, Shade performs a similar maneuver. First, he describes the 
drifting flakes of snow slowly blanketing the patch of lawn visible from his study 
window, before abruptly declaring: "Retake the falling snow" (29) and the scene is 
rerun, this time with the falling snow flakes described in exquisite close-up. Then, just 
as abruptly, he cuts to a view of the same scene the following day: 
And in the morning, diamonds of frost 
Express amazement: Whose spurred feet have crossed 
From left to right the blank page of the road? 
Reading from left to right in winter's code: 
A dot, an arrow pointing back; repeat: 
Dot, arrow pointing back ... A pheasant's feet! (29, 19-24) 
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For Nabokov as for Danielewski, then, the past is never totalized and fixed. Rather, 
like film footage that can be endlessly edited and re-edited, the past is open always to 
perpetual revisions and refigurings. This openness is logically assured since all 
reconstructions of the past are necessarily textualizations of the past, and these 
textualizations, constructed as they are from empty signifiers, can thus never be 
permanently stabilized into an immutable or fixed order. 
Again, LeRoy-Frazier is useful here. As she explains, "this movement back and 
forth in linear time" - that is, our ability to endlessly refigure the past - "is possible 
because ... as Jacques Derrida long ago argued, any use of language necessarily 
removes us from the teleological Center or logos that marks linear time" (316). Thus, 
it is hopeless trying to place texts in an historical order, since in a purely textual 
world, all fictions are essentially contemporary with each other, a situation that frees 
us to position texts in new and innovative configurations: 
Language operates in the mode of blurring the distinction between origin and 
image, or predecessor and successor - or primary text and secondary text. 
Movement along the metonymic flows in both directions, for there are no 
absolute beginning and ending points, no fixed linear order, without 
teleological time (316). 
Hence critical readings that persist in positioning Shade's text as primary and 
Kinbote's text as secondary involve a fundamental misapprehension of how 
Nabokov's view on reality and how the concomitant release from teleological 
thinking impact on the apparent structure of his novel. 
Again, reading Nabokov and Danielewski intertextually can help redress this 
prevalent critical misapprehension. As noted earlier, the peculiar layout of House of 
Leaves foregrounds the temporal simultaneity of Zampano's and Johnny's texts, 
which, like Shade's and Kinbote's, are also ostensibly related to one another as 
primary text to secondary text. Unlike Pale Fire, in which the different voices of 
Shade and Kinbote speak in tum (Shade's poem followed by Kinbote's conunentary, 
suggesting a relationship of precursor text to successor), House of Leaves groups the 
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distinct narratives of Johnny and Zampano together on the same page, distinguishing 
them through spatial arrangement and typeface. Through spatial discontinuity, 
Danielewski visualizes their temporal simultaneity: the reader's eye is forced to 
shuttle between the two, noting how each text echoes and reverberates against the 
other, as though Zampano and Johnny are speaking simultaneously. This unusual use 
of spatial form simulates the appearance of a multilayered, "ahistorical" palimpsest, 
an assemblage of documents upon which different hands have worked (Martin Brick, 
"Blueprint(s)" no pagination). 
Similarly, Pale Fire presents itself as an assemblage of documents: Shade's poem 
flanked by Kinbote's foreword, commentary, and index. And as Packman recognizes, 
implicit in this structure is "the key conceit of their potential arrangement in space: 
one document beside another on a hypothetical surface" (74). In his foreword, 
Kinbote proposes a reading contract that can help bring into sight this conception of 
the text as a spatial assemblage of documents. To eliminate inconvenient "back-and-
forth leafings" between poem and commentary, he suggests we cut his notes out and 
clip them together with the appropriate lines of Shade's poem, or place two copies of 
the text "in adjacent positions on a comfortable table" (25). Couturier singles this 
passage out as one of those "problematic points of overdetermination" that mark 
Nabokov's attempt to control the way in which his novel is read. Here, so Couturier 
argues, Nabokov simply wants to indicate Kinbote's fundamental unreliability as a 
commentator; he does not want his readers to follow Kinbote's directions. Thus 
Nabokov supplies just enough evidence in the foreword of Kinbote's unreliability (or 
for many critics, his insanity) that we are likely to reject his 'crazy' proposal and 
instead read the novel in the more conventional fashion of first page to last. However, 
if we read disobediently - that is, against the reading contract Nabokov evidently 
encourages a different relationship between Shade's and Kinbote's texts emerges. If 
one were to follow Kinbote's contract, something of the same temporal simultaneity 
we marked in House of Leaves would become apparent like Johnny's and 
Zampano's texts, Shade's poem and Kinbote's commentary are set alongside each 
other, making explicit the fundamental simultaneity of their texts. 
Nabokov's view of reality, and the release from teleological thinking this view 
entails, undercuts the validity of traditional readings that seek to uncover in Pale Fire 
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a single, controlling presence and a grounding reality critical approaches Nabokov 
encouraged through the form of his novel in a bid to limit and control the possible 
lines of interpretation. That is to say, in the absence of a common reality, Shade's 
New Wye and Kinbote's Zembla are, necessarily, equally fictional, and in the 
attendant release from linear time all texts become contemporaneous, and thus also 
equal. Simply put then, Nabokov's views inadvertently compromise the total control 
he claims over his text. Recognizing this contradiction, however, does not completely 
nullify his assertions of control; rather, as demonstrated in the paragraph above, these 
assertions are re-inscribed within a system they no longer fully dominate. 
For Nabokov, his work has meaning only insofar as it approaches totalization, that 
is, an ideally finished and self-sufficient aesthetic object immune to invasion by rival 
discourses. And Nabokov's polemic against literary criticism, articulated as a rivalry 
between the creative writer and critic, finds its fullest expression in the rivalry 
between Shade's and Kinbote's texts. The relation between 'Pale Fire' and Kinbote's 
Commentary thus emerges as that of two rival texts locked in a power struggle, each 
striving to assert the primacy of their representation of reality over that of the other. 
However, as LeRoy-Frazier rightly argues, "[b ]oth are bound to failure, ... for 
absolute dominance is impossible in a purely textual world devoid of the evaluative 
standards and hierarchical rankings that would allow one to claim a position of 
authority and hence a feeling of control over the way events happen" (317). Having 
analysed Nabokov's failed attempt to achieve complete mastery over his text, I now 
want to expand my discussion of Pale Fire to examine how Shade and Kinbote set 
about exerting control over their fictions in a textual world bereft of the conditions 
that make that desired control possible. Focusing on this power struggle also allows 
us to describe the specific dynamic of the text without becoming bogged down in the 
debate over who invented whom or which of the novel's two locales is the primary 
one. 
Shade and Totalization 
LeRoy-Frazier proposes two common responses to the problem of postmodem time 
similar to the choice between two bifurcating pathways in a multicursal labyrinth. On 
the one hand, "[t]he radical freedom into which the individual is plunged when 
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teleological conceptions of time are removed can constitute a liberating source of 
creative power in terms of one's ability personally to construct reality" (317). On the 
other, this freedom can also "be perceived as a source of deep anxiety, for it makes 
the governing force of the world not individual intitiative [sic], but blind chance"; in 
these conditions, "[o]ne's experiences no longer seem to be causally connected to one 
another; things no longer happen according to a logical plan, with a comprehensible 
end. They merely occur randomly" (318). LeRoy-Frazier focuses mainly on the 
second of these two responses. Thus she writes: 
While we might seem to have absolute power because we can create order out 
of the rubble by recombining events at will, such constructs are radically 
unstable because they are composed of empty signifiers. The created realities 
have no power over the force of chance, and hence they will always, sooner or 
later, be displaced. The empty promise of the power to create reality makes us 
acutely aware of the absence of objective reality, and of the impossibility of 
fabricating a reliable underlying logic to the course of events. We have no 
choice, however, but to delude ourselves into believing that there is a means 
of asserting control; otherwise, the anxiety becomes overwhelming and we 
risk lapsing into despair at the recognition of our vulnerability (318-19). 
Shade and Kinbote, so LeRoy-Frazier argues, suffer from just such an anxiety. Both 
writers fabricate elaborate textual realities in the hope of imparting a sense of 
coherence to the confusions and uncertainties of their lives. Yet their constructed 
realities prove interminably unstable, assemblages of empty signifiers that can never 
be definitively fixed or stabilized into an immutable order. In a world where the 
hegemony of chance holds ultimate sway, they are unable to exert control over their 
fictions or prevent them in turn from being supplemented and displaced by others. 
This situation leads Shade to attempt closure in his text, to close it to Kinbote's 
commentary as Nabokov closes his to rival hermeneutics. And like Nabokov, Shade 
assumes a position of textual mastery and control over his text. Consequently, he 
attempts to circumscribe the possibility of supplemental readings that would 
compromise this position of mastery and the integrity of his text by achieving textual 
closure or 'totalization'. Moreover, "In constructing his universe," writes LeRoy-
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Frazier, "Shade clings to the notion of an extra-textual, objective reality, which his 
aesthetic universe embodies, orders, and explains" (319). In this section, then, I 
examine how Shade sets about achieving such closure, and the implications of this 
drive for closure for the status of his art. 
Kinbote's description of the 'Pale Fire' manuscript as it stood at the time of 
Shade's death gives some indication of the poet's orderly method of composition: 
The manuscript, mostly a Fair Copy, from which the present text has been 
faithfully printed, consists of eighty medium-sized index cards, on each of 
which Shade reserved the pink upper line for headings (canto number, date) 
and used the fourteen light-blue lines for writing out with a fine nib in a 
minute, tidy, remarkably clear hand, the text of his poem, skipping a line to 
indicate double space, and always using a fresh card to begin a new Canto 
(13). 
Behind this meticulously transcribed Fair Copy is the Corrected Draft, which due to 
the poet's sudden death, Kinbote must rely upon to supply the concluding lines (lines 
949-999) of Canto Four. Unlike the Fair Copy, Kinbote describes the Corrected Draft 
as "extremely rough in appearance, teeming with devastating erasures and 
cataclysmic insertions" (14). 
In addition, Kinbote informs us of the existence of a further twelve index cards of 
variant and supplemental couples. As he explains, it is lucky these drafts have 
survived: 
As a rule, Shade destroyed drafts the moment he ceased to need them: well do 
I recall seeing him from my porch, on a brilliant morning, burning a whole 
stack of them in the pale fire of the incinerator before which he stood with 
bent head like an official mourner among the wind-borne black butterflies of 
that backyard auto-da-fe. But he saved those twelve cards because of the 
unused felicities shining among the dross of used draftings. Perhaps, he 
vaguely expected to replace certain passages in the Fair Copy with some of 
the lovely rejections in his files, or, more probably, a sneaking fondness for 
this or that vignette, suppressed out of architectonic considerations ... urged 
him to put off its disposal till the time when the marble finality of an 
immaculate typescript would have confirmed it or made the most delightful 
variant seem cumbersome and impure (15). 
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To get some idea of what Shade's "draftings" might look like, we may profitably 
refer here to the work of visual artist Saul Steinberg, and in particular an untitled 
document he composed for an issue of TriQuarterly dedicated to Nabokov's work. 
This text represents a draft of various illegible inscriptions of which only the artist's 
signature and the word "Nabokov" can be made out (see figure 2).7 As David 
Packman recognizes, this text "suggests an interesting way of approaching a book 
like Pale Fire", since its palimpsestic quality can help to expose the novel's 
"principles of composition" (73, 74). Specifically, Steinberg'S text represents visually 
the kind of documents Kinbote describes above: incomplete drafts consisting of 
illegible and overwritten textual inscriptions. 
7 Perceptively, Packman observes that "in Steinberg, as in Nabokov, signatures can be forged, 
suggesting a vertiginous disjunction between the inscription as indexical sign and the artist's 
self, which sabotages the notion of the text as self-expression and the author as author-ity" 
(73). 
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2: Saul Steinberg's 'Tribute' X 
In an essay on George Oppen, Michael Davidson coined the term "palimtcxt" to 
describe material texts of this kind, suggesting that a "pah mtextual study of poetry" 
should "look not only at the poem in relation to similar poems ... but to the writing 
each poem displaces , a displacement that is "represented" in the manuscript as a kind 
of over-writing" ("Palimtexts: Postmodem Poetry and the Material Text" (2). 
Reading Steinberg and Nabokov intertextually, then, helps bring into focus the 
specifically " palimtextual" quality of Shade's poem, and his method of composition 
as a continual over-writing of previous inscriptions as he strives to integrate his 
divergent drafts and notes into the single, unified text that best expresses his 
intentions. The reconfiguration of mimesis on this new level a il lows liS a privileged 
x Steinberg' S 'T ribute' appears in Nohu/wv: Criticism, Reminiscences, Trans/ation U/lel 
Trihutcs, 332. 
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view over Shade's shoulder into the dynamic and ongoing process of writing. This 
focus on the performative act of writing here also implicitly undermines the 
traditional realist conception of the work as an ostensibly faithful reproduction or 
mirror-like transcription of a stable, pre-existent reality. Shade's poem refers less to 
such a reality than it does to other, 'antecedent' texts. 
This impulse to control and circumscribe the writing process marks Shade's 
teleological commitment to the idea of the literary text as a totalized ideal. What is 
more, Shade's critics, like Nabokov's, seem to share something of a similar 
commitment. According to Kinbote, one prominent "Shadean" dismisses Shade's 
final poem because he believes it is merely a mass of "disjointed drafts" incapable of 
producing "a definite text", and hence unworthy of critical attention (14). With 
characteristic vanity, Kinbote writes off this judgment as "a malicious invention on 
the part of those who would wish not so much to deplore the state in which a great 
poet's work was interrupted by death as to asperse the competence, and perhaps 
honesty, of its present editor and commentator" (14). 
As Michael Wood has demonstrated, Kinbote's tone of "prickly dignity" here 
echoes that of Borges' narrator in his well-known short story "Pierre Menard, author 
of Don Quixote": "It is as if yesterday we were gathered together before the final 
marble and the fateful cypresses, and already Error is trying to tarnish [Menard's] 
Memory" (The Magician's Doubts 182). This allusion is significant, since Nabokov's 
novel and Borges' story are closely interrelated. In both works, a self-important and 
fussy first-person narrator is intent on correcting what they perceive to be the gross 
inaccuracies in the prevailing, orthodox critical judgment of a recently deceased 
writer whose work they claim final authority over. The deceased writers themselves 
also share certain characteristics, the most significant of which, as Wood points out, is 
that "Shade like Menard burned his manuscripts once he was done with them, feeding 
them to "the pale fire of the incinerator" just as Menard used to make "a gay bonfire" 
of his notebooks" (182). Wood makes an important connection here, although he does 
not develop its implications in any great length. However, as I hope to demonstrate, 
Borges's tale helps to bring into focus Shade's preoccupation with the process of 
achieving textual closure, and particularly his attempts to limit the disseminating 
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potential of his writing. I therefore offer a brief account of 'Pierre Menard' before 
discussing how these themes play out in Nabokov's novel. 
In Borges' story, Menard sets himself the impossible task of writing certain 
chapters of Don Quixote, not through a mere "mechanical transcription of the 
original," but from memory he painstakingly produces successive drafts which he 
ideally hopes will eventually converge "word for word and line for line with those of 
Miguel de Cervantes" (Ficciones, 32). In this pursuit, Menard oscillates between two 
conflicting inclinations. On the one hand, as a creative writer, he is naturally impelled 
to "attempt variants of a formal and psychological nature"; on the other hand, his 
sworn fidelity to Cervantes' text necessitates that he "sacrifice them to the 'original' 
text and irrefutably to rationalize this annihilation" (34-5). Cervantes' text, then, is the 
totalized ideal toward which Menard strives; its authority legislates the destruction of 
all material that departs, however slightly, from its ideal. Accordingly, as "the number 
of rough drafts kept on increasing, [Menard] tenaciously made corrections and tore up 
thousands of manuscript pages. He did not permit them to be examined, and he took 
great care that they would not survive him" (37). Menard's project, then, is founded 
upon two contradictory impulses that pull in different directions simultaneously. In 
the process of writing through the Quixote, he opens up a rich proliferation of 
multiple and bifurcating narrative pathways, only to necessarily over-write and 
displace these pathways in the teleological drive to converge upon the 'ideal' text of 
Cervantes. Here, the writing process inscribes a fundamental tension, a tension 
generated through a dynamic of expansion and contraction, accumulation and erasure. 
Multiple supplements are produced only to be effaced in the effort to coalesce upon a 
more manageable, singular, and above allfaithful narrative. 
Returning to Nabokov's novel, we see that Shade and Menard share a similar 
concern. Both writers, in the drive for textual closure, attempt to suppress the 
disseminating power of their draft materials. Thus Shade, like Menard, bums all trace 
of antecedent texts after having transcribed them. His Fair Copy manuscript is dated, 
but as Kinbote points out, Shade has "preserved the date of actual creation rather than 
that of second or third thoughts" (13), a move that further suppresses the dynamic 
nature of the writing process. What is important is that the finished product of Shade's 
writing process is described in terms of a "marble finality" which, as Wood subtly 
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points out, echoes the "final marble" of Menard's tombstone (182). Therefore, a 
totalized "Pale Fire" is viewed figuratively as a kind of textual 'death,' a connection 
reinforced by Kinbote's description of Shade as an "official mourner" with a "bent 
head" during the ritualized burning of his draft materials (15). Like Menard then, 
Shade's desire to circumscribe the writing process means his divergent draft materials 
are 'killed-off,' as it were, once this process is arrested and textual multiplicities are 
forced to solidify into the marble finality of a finished text. As Packman observes, 
Shade's poem "is directed toward its own composition, becoming, in essence, the 
object of desire" (104); but, again like Menard, Shade himself dies with his project 
unrealized, and his desire for totalization unfulfilled. 
For Shade, as for Nabokov, literary production has meaning only insofar as it 
approaches totalization that is, an ideally finished and delineated aesthetic object. 
For only by converting his experience within a seemingly chaotic world into 
redeeming poetic form can Shade hope to exert a degree of control (illusionary 
though it be) over the hegemony of chance: 
I feel I understand 
Existence, or at least a minute part 
Of my existence, only through my art, 
In terms of combinational delight; 
And if my private universe scans right, 
So does the verse of galaxies divine 
Which I suspect is an iambic line. (58/971-77) 
Thus, Shade values the work-as-product over the work-as-production, which means 
that (at least from Kinbote's point of view) his finished poem is born into textual 
death, a marble-like rigor mortis that suppresses the dynamic processes of 
composition and, by extension, the virtues of supplementarity. Shade's modernist 
perspective means that he strives to achieve textual mastery through closure, through 
the creation of a stable and totalized text invulnerable to displacement and 
supplementation. 
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On the day of his death, Shade is on the verge of attaining the elusive control he so 
desires. His poem is within a single line of completion, and according to Kinbote this 
final line "would have been identical to line I and would have completed the 
symmetry of the structure" (14). However, as LeRoy-Frazier writes, "the possibility 
of his achieving closure in a textual world is adamantly negated when he fails, in fact 
to "swing it." Shade's confidence in his ability to produce a mythic or governing 
representation of the world is revealed as faulty; his desire is doomed to go 
unfulfilled, for he dies in a chance accident before he can complete his epic" (320). 
The elaborate design of Shade's poem therefore has notable and rather paradoxical 
effects. On the one hand, its tight, orderly iambic line and symmetrical structure 
supports Shade's assumption that just as his poem is more highly structured and 
orderly than the common, chaotic world of 'everyday reality', correspondingly there 
is an elegantly structured cosmic order fashioned by some mysterious divine artificer 
or artificers the existence of which we can only ever accept on faith. On the other 
-hand, "Pale Fire" demonstrates the impossibility of fashioning such a governing 
representation at all; glimpses of a divine order turn out to be merely "misprints", and 
even the law of the gods is subject to "topsy-turvical" coincidence. Ironically, 
Gradus's murder of Shade provides the poet with the "transcendence" he was unable 
to achieve through the power of his art (LeRoy-Frazier, 321). 
In light of this, Kinbote cannot help but read "Pale Fire" with an ominous sense of 
the poet's impending death. Thus, in his commentary he meticulously synchronizes 
the composition of Shade's poem with Gradus's gradual approach to New Wye: 
[Gradus's] departure for Western Europe, with a sordid purpose in his heart 
and a loaded gun in his pocket, took place on the very day that an innocent 
poet in an innocent land was beginning Canto Two of Pale Fire. We shall 
accompany Gradus in constant thought, as he makes his way from distant dim 
Zembla to green Appalachia, though the entire length of the poem, following 
the road of its rhythm, riding past in a rhyme, skidding around the corner of a 
run-on, breathing with the caesura, swinging down to the foot of the page 
from line to line as from branch to branch, hiding between two words ... 
reappearing on the horizon of a new canto, steadily marching nearer in iambic 
motion, crossing streets, moving up with his valise on the escalator of the 
pentameter, stepping off, boarding a new train of thought, entering the hall of 
a hotel, putting out the bedlight, while Shade blots out a word, and falling 
asleep as the poet lays down his pen for the night (65). 
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These two narrative lines converge in Kinbote's note on the poem's final, unwritten 
line (an ironic repetition of the first line: "I was the shadow of the waxwing slain") 
where he recounts the circumstances of Shade's tragic encounter with Gradus. 
Kinbote's synchronization emphasizes some fundamental connection between the 
composition of "Pale Fire" and the approach of the Zemblan assassin; as his 
commentary unfolds it appears as if "the force propelling [Gradus to New Wye] is the 
magic action of Shade's poem itself, the mechanism and sweep of verse, the powerful 
iambic motor. Never before has the inexorable advance of fate received such a 
sensuous form." (110). 
Much criticism of Pale Fire has interpreted this synchronization as merely 
evidence of Kinbote's rampant paranoia, his mania for establishing correlations 
J?etween the circumstances of his own life and those of Shade's poem. Such readings, 
however, are wholly reductive, and overlook an important implication of Kinbote's 
pervasive patterning. The arrival of Gradus is, I suggest, the necessary outcome of 
Shade's writing project. Here we can profitably refer to Elizabeth Ermarth's account 
ofDerrida's ideas of structure and play: 
To the extent that a structure limits play in the interest of closure, precision, or 
"perfection," it becomes "ruined" because its very completeness - its 
"totalization" - uses up its options to the point that no new formulations, no 
new experiments or adventures are possible. By contrast, the incompleteness 
of living systems guarantees a continuation because the possibility of play 
remains open. In other words, and not to put too fine a point on it, systems 
that seek to exclude play are also seeking death (Sequel to History 148). 
Literary structures, then, which limit play for the sake of closure, are petrified and 
lifeless, whereas incomplete structures contain play and therefore remain vital and 
dynamic. For Ermarth, (and also, as we have seen, for Danielewski), the process of 
supplementarity is essential to the vitality of incomplete systems. Supplementarity 
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ensures that "a fixed system or syntax is perpetually renewed by the necessity of 
substitution: substitution of one term, one experiment, one improvisation after another 
as dictated by some irreducible ambiguity in the system of signs. This 
supplementarity ... prevents the system from being totalized and "ruined" (148-49). 
It is from this perspective that we can begin to understand the role Gradus plays in 
the novel. Shade, despite valuing "texture" over "text," circumscribes his writing 
process in the interest of closure and totalization. He integrates his divergent draft 
material into a single, fixed poetic structure, and thereby reduces the possibility of 
play, the possibility of "new experiments or adventures." Therefore it is possible to 
suggest provided one accepts the concept of the self as a text that Shade is in 
some sense writing his own death. In this reading, it is no accident that the 
movements of Gradus the embodiment of death in the novel - are in perfect 
harmony with the poem's composition, or that he murders Shade at the exact moment 
his poem reaches a point of totalization. That is to say, Gradus's approach literalizes 
the fact that the desire for textual totalization is also a desire for death. Packman, 
drawing on the concepts and terminology of Deleuze, has shown that Gradus is less a 
distinct character within the novel's projected fictional world(s) and more a self-
reHexive device. As he observes, Gradus's trajectory through the poem deflects 
attention away from traditional novelistic representation by laying bare the workings 
of the Shade's "literary machine." Gradus is, then, "no flesh-and-blood creature but 
rather a literary mechanism" (83), the iambic motor that propels Shade's literary 
machine forward in its drive toward totalization and consequently "death, the end of 
the line" (85). 
Whereas Shade hedges his text against the encroachment of Kinbote's commentary, 
the narrators of House of Leaves are much less resistant to the process of 
supplementarity and the crucial role it plays in the perpetual renewal of language 
systems. This becomes evident if we compare the different status accorded to 
incompleteness in both works. Like "Pale Fire," Zampano's 'The Navidson Record' is 
an incomplete text, a chaotic palimpsest of overwritten and displaced inscriptions. But 
whereas this represents the failure of Shade's bid for textual closure or totalization, 
Zampano's deliberately incomplete novel generously accommodates any number of 
supplemental readings. Teeming with aporias and contradictions, Zampano's text 
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demonstrates how the gaps In real history become serendipitous occasions for 
appropriation and invention. Examining a particularly fragmentary section of the 
manuscript, Johnny notes that "Zampano provided the blanks but never filled them 
in" (63); elsewhere he observes that "[s]ome kind of ash landed on the following 
pages, in some places burning away small holes, in other places eradicating large 
chunks of text" (323). In the process of editing the manuscript, Johnny fills in these 
gaps, decides whether to "resurrect" deletions, and arbitrates between variant readings 
of the same passages (111). He actively completes or supplements the gaps with his 
own texts, taking Zampano's words as a catalyst for his own improvised textual 
performances and adventures. And it is this process of supplementarity, this potential 
interminable substitution of one experiment after another, which prevents Zampano's 
text from sinking into sterility and textual death. 
The "dialogical tension" produced by Pale Fire's special poem-and-commentary 
structure dramatizes two radically different attitudes toward textual closure 
(Packman, 77). If Shade's project is to suppress the unruly complexity of his drafts by 
smoothing away divergent readings into a single, closed poem, Kinbote's reading and 
commentary inverts this work by, as it were, exhuming and resuscitating the latent 
supplementarity that lies buried beneath the final marble of Shade's totalized text. 
The struggle for control played out in the novel manifests itself in these two 
competing impulses, and as we shall see, this conflict remains unresolved, since 
neither writer is able to assert total control over the other in a purely textual world. 
Kinbote and Supplementarity 
Like Navidson's endlessly shifting labyrinth, which grows and shrinks in response 
to the individual's mental state, Zampano's text grows and shrinks according to 
Johnny's desire, as he literally constructs the text in ways that foreground some 
elements of the assemblage while suppressing others. Thus 'The Navidson Record,' 
pieced together from a thousand disparate fragments, is as much Johnny's production 
as it is Zampano's. Moreover, Johnny freely modifies Zampano's text in order to 
make it conform more nearly to his own experiences, and these interventions radically 
destabilize the authenticity and integrity of 'The Navidson Record,' since we have no 
way of ascertaining which sections of the manuscript he has tampered with and which 
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are faithfully reproduced. In short, Johnny's commentary and Zampano's text are so 
thoroughly enmeshed that notions of 'originality' and 'authenticity' are altogether 
undercut. As Danielewski remarks, there is no "sacred" or authoritative text in House 
of Leaves, since at every level of the novel some form of intervention is taking place 
(see "Haunted House" 121). 
Kinbote's commentary, which functions as an extended supplement to Shade's 
poem, enters into a similarly ambiguous relationship with its 'source.' Shade cannot 
achieve total control of his text; in its unfinished state, it remains open as Zampano' s 
does to supplementation and displacement. Kinbote relates in his commentary how he 
urgently pressed upon Shade his fabulous Zemblan narrative in the hope that the poet 
would commemorate this story in verse. Shade, of course, had no such intention, as a 
disappointed Kinbote learns on first reading "Pale Fire": 
I sped through it, snarling, as furious young heir through an old deceiver's 
testament. Where were the battlements of my sunset castle? Where was 
Zembla the Fair? Where her spine of mountains? Where her long thrill 
through the mist? ... Nothing of it was there! The complex contribution I had 
been pressing upon him with a hypnotist's patience and a lover's urge was 
simply not there. Oh, but I cannot express the agony! Instead of the wild 
glo~ious romance what did I have? An autobiographical, eminently 
Appalachian, rather old-fashioned narrative in a neo-Popian prosodic style 
beautifully written of course Shade could not write otherwise than 
beautifully - but void of my magic, of that special rich streak of magical 
madness which I was sure would run through it and make it transcend its time 
(232-33). 
On a second, closer reading however, Kinbote begins to detect what he takes to be 
tenuous signs of his influence: 
Gradually I regained my usual composure, I reread Pale Fire more carefully. I 
liked it better when expecting less. And what was that? What was that dim 
distant music, those vestiges of color in the air? Here and there I discovered in 
it and especially, especially in the invaluable variants, echoes and spangles of 
my mind, a long ripplewake of my glory (233). 
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Thus, in reading the 'finished' poem alongside the rejected variants, Kinbote makes it 
seem as if, initially at least, Shade really did take the Zemblan story as his subject, 
which now exists as a kind of submerged or over-written story underlying the final 
text. In Kinbote's account then, his text - far from being merely parasitic - in fact 
emerges as the progenitor of Shade's poem, the primary text to which the poem owes 
its very existence. The variant material Shade tried so hard to suppress allows 
Kinbote to, as it were, read 'beneath' the surface of the poem, to detect in it the 
Zemblan story he hoped to find on his first reading, in the same way Johnny restored 
various struck-out passages so as to read his own story into Zampano's text. In this 
way, Kinbote seeks to assert the historical primacy of his text, and his representation 
of reality, over that of Shade's poem. 
Kinbote attempts to exert control over Shade's poem by proving that his Zemblan 
story is in fact the 'source': "My commentary to this poem, now in the hands of my 
readers, represents an attempt to sort out those echoes and wavelets of fire, and pale 
phosphorescent hints, and all the many subliminal debts to me" (233). Kinbote's 
references here to "wavelets of fire" and "pale phosphorescent hints" recalls the "pale 
fire" of the incinerator in which Shade ritually destroyed his draft materials as he 
strove to totalize his poem and thus render it immune to invasion by Kinbote's rival 
text. Here, Kinbote quite explicitly figures these destroyed drafts as the Zemblan 
material of which Shade's final text "has been deliberately and drastically drained of 
every trace" (67). Kinbote therefore seeks to bring into view again this suppressed 
supplemental profusion. In his commentary, he reproduces what variant readings have 
survived, and forms from these the base material upon which he hangs his larger 
Zemblan supplement, his story of Charles Xavier. Thus, although he may appear to be 
a self-motivated, autonomous subject, his agency is to a large degree dependent upon 
his interaction with Shade's text; his self-image, as well as our perception of him, is in 
fact born out of the contestation of two divergent agencies as they are played out in 
the textual space of Shade's poem. 
81 
Like Kinbote and Shade, Johnny and Zampano are also locked in a struggle for 
textual control, each trying to assert mastery over the other. However, as we have 
seen, this relationship is inherently unstable; both writers keep shifting and changing 
their respective positions in an endless game of musical chairs. Danielewski gives this 
volatile relationship concrete expression in the image of the brass-bull torture device. 
Paradoxically enough, Johnny and Zampano are figured simultaneously as the bull 
encapsulating the other, and the victim encapsulated by the other. In this 
configuration, the desired control slips elusively back and forth between the two; 
neither one is able to finally position themselves as the source of the other's words. 
The dynamic of transference figured here finds its analogue in the Shakespearean 
sun-and-moon imagery of Nabokov's novel, which figures forth the complex 
transferential relationship between Kinbote and Shade and their respective texts. This 
imagery appears in the second, crucial supplement Kinbote introduces into his 
commentary, a variant reading of lines 39-40 of Shade's poem: " ... and home would 
haste my thieves, / The sun with stolen ice, the moon with leaves" (66). Kinbote 
correctly identifies these lines as an allusion to Shakespeare's Timon of Athens, 
coincidentally the only book he has with him in his isolated log cabin. Since this copy 
is a Zemblan poetical translation by his uncle Conmal, Kinbote is forced to retranslate 
the appropriate passage back into English rather than cite directly from the original: 
The sun is a thief: she lures the sea 
and robs it. The moon is a thief: 
he steals his silvery light from the sun. 
The sea is a thief: it dissolves the moon (66). 
Although Kinbote hopes this translation "sufficiently approximates the text, or is at 
least faithful to its spirit" (66), it is, of course, hilariously inept when compared to the 
fluency and power of Shakespeare's original: 
The sun's a thief, and with his great attraction 
Robs the vast sea; the moon's an arrant thief, 
And her pale fire she snatches from the sun; 
The sea's a thief, whose liquid surge resolves 
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The moon into salt tears. (IV. iii. 432-36) 
For Borges, 'original' texts may be considered inferior or unfaithful to their 
translations, insofar as translations are able to bring out and realize possibilities only 
latent in the 'original.' In this reading, all texts are simply drafts-in-progress that 
gesture toward some meaning they can never fully realize9• If we apply this reasoning 
to Kinbote's "retranslated translation" (Patrick O'Donnell, "Watermark" 390), then, it 
is possible to suggest that it is in fact superior to the original since, despite its 
lackluster, galumphing rhythm, it partakes of or enacts the process of which 
Shakespeare's 'original' merely speaks. 
More importantly for our purposes, however, is the implicit negation here of any 
notion of textual 'origin' or 'source'. Pale Fire criticism has normally interpreted this 
metaphor as a description of the supposedly dubious relationship between poem and 
commentary. In this reading, Shade and Kinbote are as sun and moon to each other; 
just as the moon steals its light from the sun, Kinbote's farcical commentary steals its 
"opalescent light" from the "fiery orb" of Shade's poem, positioned here as the source 
text from which Kinbote's narrative represents an aberrant deviation (67). But its 
implications extend much further than that. As Patrick O'Donnell recognises, the 
Shakespearean metaphor "suggests that there is no "authoritative" text in Pale Fire, 
no ultimate fount or source of significance, just as in nature there is no beginning to 
the cycle that transfers power from sun to moon to sea and back again" (391). Similar 
then to the brass bull image in House of Leaves, this Shakespearean metaphor implies 
• that neither Shade nor Kinbote can claim a position of authority as the source of the 
other's words. Rather, as LeRoy-Frazier points out, their "relationship is constantly in 
flux," so that like Johnny and Zampano, "it is impossible to claim that Shade is 
always Kinbote's creator, or that Kinbote is always Shade's. Both propositions are 
always true: Shade and Kinbote are each others' creators" (326). 
This is possible because the logic of the supplement short-circuits the binary 
distinction between primary text and secondary text, origin and image, so that both 
terms enter into an undecidable play and exchange of attributes. Since - as Derrida 
9 See Hayles "Translating Media" 268, and Efrain Kristal Invisible Work: Borges and 
Translation. 
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has shown there is no escaping from the "logic of supplementarity", recourse to 
origins or sources is impossible. Consequently, and to reiterate, it becomes impossible 
to place texts in an historical order; in a textual world, all fictions are effectively 
contemporaneous and equal. Thus, as O'Donnel1 argues, 
every text in Pale Fire - Foreword, Poem, Commentary, and Index is 
supplementary to the others, a corruption and thieflike translation. The novel 
enacts what Jacques Derrida, in an analysis of the differences between writing 
and speech, cites as a mythical instance of "supplementarity" evidenced by the 
story of the Egyptian god of writing, Thoth: "As the god of language second 
and of linguistic difference, Thoth can become the god of the creative word 
only by metonymic substitution, by historical displacement, and sometimes by 
violent subversion ... This type of substitution thus puts Thoth in Ra's place 
as the moon takes the place of the sun. The god of writing thus supplies the 
place of Ra, supplementing him and supplanting him in his absence and 
essential disappearance. Such is the origin of the moon as supplement to the 
sun, of night light as supplement to daylight" (391-92). 
Thus, refracted through the lens of Derrida's notion of the supplement, Nabokov's 
novel again uncannily mirrors House of Leaves, since Danielewski explicitly draws on 
these Derridean ideas (along with the brass bull image) to describe the cyclical game 
of metonymic substitution that Johnny and Zampano are caught up in. On the one 
hand, Zampano creates Johnny as the son or "sun" (542) who will inherit and 
complete his unfmished manuscript; on the other hand, Johnny supplants and 
supplements Zampano in taking the old man's place after his death, and there is a 
sense in which he in tum creates Zampano by editing 'The Navidson Record' into a 
coherent document. 
Seen from this perspective, Nabokov's authorship tease, which, as we have seen, 
has locked Pale Fire criticism into a line of inquiry that only serves to reinforce his 
control over the text, is rendered null and void, since it is impossible and thus 
pointless trying to fix either Shade or Kinbote as the controlling, authoritative voice of 
the novel. Rather, their respective texts, like those of Johnny and Zampano, endlessly 
reflect and mirror each other; in a textual world neither one is finally able to assert 
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dominance and control over the other. LeRoy-Frazier succinctly sums up the situation 
thus: 
Pate Fire ... portrays a postmodern world in which there are no rules - with 
the exception of chance - and any search for individual autonomy is revealed 
as an illusionary conquest. Although one is free to create one's own personal 
reality, one cannot claim a stable, essential identity that is not both anticipated 
and reflected somehow in that of another. Even the possibility of self-
definition through difference is eliminated when the self is recognized as a 
text that endlessly reflects and is reflected by other texts. Only in terms of 
artificially positing one's own text, however unoriginal, as hierarchically 
superior to others' texts can one fabricate a sense of autonomy and control 
an autonomy that is eventually negated by the hegemony of chance in a 
random world (323). 
Little wonder, then, that "definitive" critical readings intent on elevating one author 
over the other have proven so unstable and reversible. The decision to assign control 
to either Shade or Kinbote is an ultimately undecidable and hence arbitrary one. The 
very structure of this aporia guarantees the impossibility of a definitive, total answer; 
therefore, critical interpretations aimed at solving the attribution problem once and for 
all are destined for failure. The novel simply cannot compel a required or necessary 
reading of itself. 
Nevertheless, Boyd argues against those who suggest the problem of authorship is 
finally unsolvable: 
[some critics] maintain that Nabokov undermines the apparent dual authorship 
but deliberately leaves the attribution question unresolved, so that while there 
is evidence that either Shade or Kinbote could have written the whole, the 
reader, like someone looking at the perceptual psychologists' pet image, now 
sees duck, now rabbit, but cannot settle on a single stable response (114). 
For Boyd, Nabokov is very much in control of every element of his text; there is a 
correct interpretation to this problem waiting to be discovered by his most persistent 
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and dedicated readers. What Boyd fails to recognize is that the very structure of the 
novel undermines any definitive answer to this question, such that Nabokov's novel 
becomes a perceptual psychologists' image despite itself. Moreover, as LeRoy-Frazier 
points out, "by denying the validity of other possible readings of the novel and fixing 
his own immutably correct formulation, Boyd's criticism itself "closes off the play" 
of interpretation and re-enacts that same teleological preoccupation Derrida posits as 
one typical response to the postmodem world" (324), a response which, like Shade's 
teleological drive for closure, is bound to fail. Nevertheless, in his Magic of Artistic 
Discovery, Boyd believes he has finally cracked the novel's secret. In this new 
reading, Boyd argues that Shade is the controlling voice of the text, effectively 
composing both poem and commentary, the latter by exerting a ghostly influence over 
Kinbote. Ironically, then, Boyd's insistence on ghostly possessions (Shade'S 
possession by Hazel's ghost and, in tum, Kinbote's possession by Shade), only serves 
to expand and accentuate Pale Fire's transferential drama. 
Conclusion 
In fact, there is no translation, it is transformation. You really have to betray the 
novel in order to be faithful to it. 
David Cronenberg on the process of adapting a novel to the screen. 10 
Like so many of Nabokov's exegetes, Boyd offers a reductive, normalized, and 
overly pious interpretation of Pale Fire. Like so many others, he attempts to dispel the 
intolerable sense of indeterminacy he finds in the novel by affixing to it a fmal, 
immutably correct interpretation, and as such misconstrues the true value and richness 
of the Nabokovian legacy or "inheritance." For as Derrida has argued, 
The radical and necessary heterogeneity of an inheritance ... is never fully 
gathered ... Its presumed unity, if there is one, can only consist in the 
injunction to reaffirm by choosing. You must filter, select, criticise; you must 
sort out among several of the possibilities which inhabit the same injunction 
... in contradictory fashion around a secret. [For] if the legibility of a legacy 
10 Cited in John Doggett Williams, "David Cronenberg on Spider". 
was given, natural, transparent, univocal; if it did not simultaneously call for 
and defy interpretation, one could never inherit from it. One would be affected 
by it as by a cause - natural or genetic. One always inherits a secret which 
says: 'Read me, will you ever be up to it?' (cited in Keith Jenkins, Refiguring 
History 29). 
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As an inheritance, Pale Fire demands to be read, and thus a decision must be made on 
how to approach the novel critically, whether to take its apparent structure at face 
value or unify the text by refiguring it as the product of a single narrative voice. 
However, this crucial interpretive decision remains undecidable, always in a state of 
play, since there is no solid ground upon which to arbitrate between the two options. 
The very undecidability of the interpretive process ensures that we will always fail to 
get Nabokov's text under control, ensures that we will always get it 'wrong'. And this 
situation allows us the freedom to read the novel in ways it never intended to allow. 
Here, creative freedom lies in failure, in the impossibility of ever closing off the play 
of the text. Indeed, for Derrida it is this very freedom to read texts creatively, 
imaginatively, and disobediently that constitutes an actual "reading" of them at all, as 
opposed to an obedient, passive description. Derrida's ethics of reading suggests that 
we should read texts as disobediently as possible, so that we may open them up 
beyond their own attempted closures and thereby pave the way for endlessly new, 
innovative interpretations. 
Paradoxically, then, like Johnny's reading of Zampano's text and Kinbote's reading 
of Shade's, fully engaging with the Nabokovian text means adopting a creative and 
irreverent approach that departs from its subject so as to more faithfully preserve its 
spirit. What I have tried to do in this chapter, then, is produce a kind of 
"Danielewskian" reading ofNabokov by positioning House of Leaves as a supplement 
to Pale Fire, with supplement understood here in the strict Derridean sense: 
Danielewski's novel repeats, reiterates, and completes Nabokov's book at the same 
time as it shatters the integrity of the "original" text. In this way, Danielewski's novel 
helps to throw into sharp relief the points of instability latent in Pale Fire's special 
form, and thereby move that text beyond its author-determined point of closure and 
open it up to a future-directed process of interpretation wherein the reader is free is 
discover or produce new and innovative readings. To this end, I have structured my 
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thesis in imitation or mimicry of the compositional structuration of the novels 
themselves, reading House of Leaves first and reflecting that work back onto the 
Nabokov's earlier text. For as we have seen, all texts in the intertextual network are 
essentially contemporary with one another, a situation that allows us to position texts 
in ever new and interesting configurations. 
By way of conclusion, I would like to quote one of John Cage's mesostic poems 
from his book Composition in Retrospect. As practiced by Cage, the mesostic form is 
similar to that of an acrostic only the vertically spelled word is down the middle 
instead of the side, and the words making up the poem are invariably drawn from a 
source text. Similar to William Burroughs'S "cut-up" technique, Cage uses mesostics 
as a way of re-reading canonical modernist texts, as a kind of Ariadne's thread for 
tracing his own singular readings through such overtly labyrinthine texts as Pound's 
Cantos and Joyce's Finnegans Wake. The following mesostic, then, forms a particular 
apt way to lead out my own singular reading through Nabokov's prison-labyrinth (the 
mesostic word here is IMITATION): 
the past must be Invented 










Critical analyses of Pale Fire have consistently focused on Nabokov's struggle to 
assert control over his text. Nowhere is this more evident than in considering the problem 
of authorship in the novel. Many correspondences can be identified between the texts 
attributed to Shade and Kinbote, and this has raised questions as to whether the two 
figures are indeed the authors of their respective texts, or whether both poem and 
commentary are in fact the work of a single author. The text itself remains unyielding in 
response to this riddle. Nabokov's authorial conundrum therefore rests unresolved within 
the fabric of the novel. Critics intent on uncovering Pale Fire's 'authentic' authorial 
voice, and thus discovering the 'true' meaning of the novel, are therefore left looking to 
Nabokov for clues. Of course, such an interpretive methodology assumes that a definitive 
answer itself exists, that Nabokov did indeed ordain some singular authoritative meaning 
for the text. And this is precisely what the author wants. Nabokov constructs his novel as 
a sealed 'black box' closed to readerly interpretation, thereby affirming his own tyranny 
as the novel's supreme authorial force. In this reading, then, Nabokov's novel is 
fundamentally author-directed. 
However, as I have argued, reading Pale Fire through the lens of House of Leaves 
allows for a radical renegotiation of the Nabokovian text. In contrast to Nabokov's 
ostensibly restrictive author-directed text, Danielewski's novel is expressly reader-
orientated. The reader is openly invited to enter the labyrinthine textual space of House of 
Leaves and participate in the 'meaning-making' process. Here meaning is unfixed and 
mutable. Rather than searching for some predetermined authorial intent, the reader is 
encouraged to supplement and re-inscribe Zampano's already extensively annotated 
manuscript, actively bringing their own voice(s) to bear on the text, thus endlessly 
transforming Danielewski's open-ended project. Readerly projection emerges as the 
novel's primary concern. 
Jill LeRoy-Frazier, whose ideas I drew upon in my discussion of Nabokov, is one of 
the few critics to have rigorously applied post-structuralist ideas to Pale Fire. The 
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implicitly negative thrust of her argument however, tends to obscure the potentially 
liberating implications of the Derridean ideas of language on which she draws. For her, 
our inability to achieve control in a textual world is seen predominantly as a source of 
deep anxiety. Thus Danielewski's novel provides the perfect corrective lens through 
which to read Pale Fire, since he is much more sanguine about the instability of language 
constructs than LeRoy-Frazier is. For Danielewski (as indeed for Derrida), in the 
recognition of language's instability and hence the interminable undecidability of the 
interpretive process lies the promise of ever-new textual possibilities and adventures still 
to come in the openness of an untotalized future. Danielewski therefore fills his text with 
gaps and aporias, generously inviting the reader to attach any personal meaning to it they 
see fit. And in direct contrast to Nabokov, this invitation extends even to the attribution 
of authorship: 
[one question House of Leaves poses is] whether or not the novel can be seen as 
having a single dominant voice creating all the others, and if so, identifying that 
voice. In short: who really is the originator of this book? ... But I'm not going to 
answer because for me to move further and further into the narrative details 
would require me to begin to deprive readers of the private joys of making such a 
discovery on their own ("Haunted House" 115). 
This is not the discovery of something in the text, but rather the reader's discovery of 
their own imbrication in the process of meaning-making, their ability to write and rewrite 
the text, to freely position any of its three main narrators as the novel's dominant voice. 
Thus the relationship between Danielewski's novel and the reader is less inflexible and 
authoritarian, and more open and dynamic than that of Pale Fire. While Nabokov strives 
for closure and textual mastery, Danielewski constructs his novel in such a way as to 
ensure that meaning is produced and realized only in the interaction between reader and 
book, and thus always in process, provisional, and open to perpetual revision. Far from 
attempting to fix one authoritative meaning, Danielewski invites the reader to freely 
supplement the text with his or her own words. As he says in the Critique interview: "The 
way that Johnny projects himself into, or onto, Zampano's book shows how the text of 
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'The Navidson Record' functions as it is being read and assembled by the readers 
themselves. Johnny even goes so far as to modify it. Not only does the book permit that, 
it is really saying to the reader, "Now you modify it"" ("Haunted House" 120). Meaning 
slides elusively back and forth between reader and book, and it is through this process of 
supplementarity, this interminable substitution of one experiment, one improvisation after 
another, that Danielewski's hopes will prevent his novel from becoming 'totalized' and 
thus solidifying into immobility and textual death. 
Conversely, Nabokov strives to totalize his text, to render it immune to invasion by 
other rival texts. What Shute calls "the battle for the last word" (642) forms both the 
subject matter as well as the central structuring principle of the novel. In a sense, then, 
Pale Fire has suffered a kind of textual death; Nabokov's authorship tease, which has set 
the terms in which Pale Fire continues to be read today, only serves to reinforce his 
control over the text. What is more, criticism has been at least partially successful in 
domesticating Pale Fire's excesses and idiosyncrasies. This much at least is clear: the 
critical debate of who invented whom is now fully exhausted. Thus if Nabokov's novel is 
to remain a vital and relevant text, different interpretive strategies must now come into 
play. Mark Danielewski's House of Leaves, seen here as a post-modem, poststructuralist 
repetition or iteration of Pale Fire, provides a valuable lens through which to re-interpret 
Nabokov's novel, and thus give to it a new life or 'after-life' beyond both Nabokov's 
authorial tyranny and the attempted closures of the normative, complicit criticism. House 
of Leaves can help bring into focus the aporias or points of undecidability latent in the 
special poem-and-commentary structure of Nabokov's novel, and thus open the text up 
and prepare it for endlessly new, innovative, and disobedient readings. This approach 
might be what Deleuze calls "counter-effectuation": "to be the mime of what effectively 
occurs, to double the actualisation with a counter actualisation, the identification with a 
distance, like the true actor or dancer, is to give to the truth of the event the only chance 
of not being confused with its inevitable actualisation" (The Logic of Sense 161). In the 
House of Leaves-inflected reading offered here, the textual knots and contradictions of 
Pale Fire are not smoothed over, but accentuated, repeated, and highlighted, so that 
Nabokov's novel becomes its own 'double'. And it is in this space, the space opened up 
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here between the event and its counter-effectuated double that allows Nabokov's novel to 
finally resemble itself. 
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